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The Case of the New York Court of Appeals
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KEVIN M. QUINN††
INTRODUCTION
This Article is a first attempt to bring quantitative
techniques that have been developed to analyze the
behavior of judges on United States Supreme Court to
analyze the behavior of judges on a state’s highest court
over an extended period of time.1 Our subject is the New
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thank David Lieberman, Anna Harvey, Steve Sugarrnan, Chuck Weisselberg,
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School of Law for helpful comments. This work was supported by the National
Science Foundation (SES 07-51834).
1. Much of the work on state supreme courts by judicial politics and public
law scholars has focused on cross-state comparisons. Some comparisons are
largely descriptive. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss
Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 774-75 (1981); Robert A. Kagan, Bliss
Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The Business of State
Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122, 124-26 (1977); Robert A.
Kagan, Bobby D. Infelise & Robert R. Detlefsen, American State Supreme Court
Justices, 1900-1970, 9 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 371, 373-74 (1984); Stanton
Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan & Lawrence M. Friedman, Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-
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York Court of Appeals from 1900 to 1941. The New York
Court of Appeals was the preeminent common law court in
the United States during this period, which includes the
tenure of Benjamin Cardozo (1914–1932), perhaps the
leading common law jurist of the time.2 This was a period of
significant transformation in American law.3 There was a
turn away from styles of judicial argument associated with
formalism, or what Roscoe Pound described as
“jurisprudence of concepts,” and a turn to styles of judicial
argument later associated with legal realism, which
acknowledges the frailty and plasticity of legal concepts and
overtly appeals to concerns of policy or fairness.4 It was a
period of significant transformation in the substantive law
of torts (particularly accident law)5 and of contract. It was a
period of significant transformation in state constitutional
law in which state legislatures, after much contestation,
were given carte blanche to regulate commerce and the
workplace under the police power.6
Our data consist of all decisions of the New York Court
of Appeals during this period. While this was a period of
significant transformation in American law, there is a
1970, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 404-06 (1987). In some cases, state-to-state
institutional variability is used to estimate the causal effect of institutions on
outcomes. See Richard P. Caldarone, Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark,
Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability: An Analysis of State Supreme
Court Abortion Cases, 71 J. POL. 560, 562 (2009); Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom
S. Clark, Judicial Independence and Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
21, 41-42, 52 (2009);.
2. See, e.g., ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 1-2 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 9-10 (1990).
3. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 4-5.
4. William Nelson argues the originality of Cardozo’s approach to the law is
that it conceived of law not as “a science internal law . . . that . . . resulted in
mechanical jurisprudence. In its place, he substituted a scientific analysis of
societal needs in pursuit of law’s ultimate end of achieving social justice.”
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY
IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980 24 (2001).
5. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN TORT LAW 152 (2004). Witt
devotes a chapter to a 1911 decision of the New York Court of Appeals authored
by Judge William Werner, which held the state workmen’s compensation
statute unconstitutional. Id. at 152-86.
6. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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striking stability in the frequency of nonunanimous
decisions over the period. Over the period, the percentage of
nonunanimous decisions fluctuates around an average of
14% of all cases and 25% cases in which there is a written
opinion; judges on the New York Court of Appeals were not
bashful about disagreeing publicly. Also striking is the
frequency of cases decided nonunanimously that are decided
per curiam with no opinion or in which there is a majority
opinion but no dissenting opinion. Judges on the New York
Court of Appeals were willing to record their disagreements
publicly without an explanation.
The large number of nonunanimous decisions—typically
sixty to one hundred per term—makes it possible to look for
patterns of agreement and disagreement among judges for
each term and across terms. To investigate this, we fit unidimensional item response theory (IRT) models to all
nonunanimous decisions for each term. The model usefully
captures patterns of agreement and disagreement among
judges. For much of the period we study, the model reveals
patterned voting. For a significant number of terms, the
model reveals the sort of highly-patterned voting that leads
outside observers to describe voting as polarized.
Such patterned voting suggests that it is possible to
speak of a dominant dimension of disagreement on a court.
This raises the question of what the dominant dimension of
disagreement might be. Looking at the modern United
States Supreme Court, that dimension seems inescapably
political. It would be surprising if this was true of the New
York Court of Appeals during the period we study, for it was
a different time, and the court had a very different docket.
To get insights on what may have been the underlying
disagreements that produce patterned voting in the New
York Court of Appeals, we look for the issues that seem to
divide the judges in the cases where they divide along the
dominant pattern. We find these issues change significantly
over the period we study. In the early years of the twentieth
century, the judges seem to divide on three dimensions that
might be described as moralism, legalism, and pragmatism.
These disagreements do not correspond in a straightforward
way with a judge’s political or social views. During the
period from 1917 to 1925, the dominant divisions seem to
implicate views on whether, and to what extent, liability for
accidental harm should be fault-based and the appropriate
tradeoff between stability and flexibility in the law. One
could describe the wings of the court during this period as
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progressive and conservative. The departure of two
conservative judges from the court in 1926 reveals subtle
divisions within what had been the progressive wing of the
court. By the late 1930s, the court is divided on recognizable
ideological lines in labor and constitutional cases and in
personal injury cases. Interestingly, the “right” wing of the
court in labor and constitutional cases is the proplaintiff
wing in personal injury cases. We think this is evidence that
personal injury law was not thought of in instrumental or
ideological terms by the judges on the court.
I. DATA COLLECTION AND CODING
The raw data for this project are the records of all cases
decided by the New York Court of Appeals from September
1900 to August 1941. These data were manually
downloaded as ASCII text files from Lexis in what were
typically monthly chunks.7 Nearly 30,000 cases were
downloaded.
Even though these files were downloaded as simple text
files with no additional markup or tagging, they are
nonetheless highly structured. This allowed us to extract a
large amount of information fairly quickly and efficiently by
writing a few programs in Python that parsed the textual
data using regular expressions. Some variables, such as
date, parties, case citations, and the number of words in the
opinion, were coded in an entirely automated manner.
Other variables, such as the votes of the judges, required
some human intervention. However, even here the terms
used to describe the voting blocs were typically
standardized, which allowed us to rely on machine coding
for a majority of the judge-case votes. Cases in which the
description of the voting blocs did not match a standard
pattern were set aside for human coding. Two research
assistants—both of whom are PhD candidates with JDs—
along with one of the authors of this Article read and coded
the votes from all of these cases. A judge’s vote was coded as
either being in agreement with the result reached by the
minority, not being in agreement with the majority result,

7. New York Court of Appeals Data, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com
(search “NY State Cases, Combined” for “court(appeals) and date(geq (1/1/1920)
and leq(1/31/1920))”).
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or missing (due to abstention, absence from the court, etc.).8
Three-person agreement rates were high. When there were
disagreements, the authors read the entire case and made a
decision as to the proper coding. In all but a handful of
cases, the correct coding was extremely clear.
We also had the research assistants do some selective
hand coding of case characteristics that were not possible to
automatically extract. For instance, we had them code
whether cases from the 1918 term involved a personal
injury claim, an insurance claim, or whether they dealt with
election law, criminal law, or homicide. We also coded the
aspects of the procedural history of the case, including
whether the appellate division reversed or modified a ruling
of the New York State Supreme Court and whether there
was a dissent at the appellate division.
II. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE FACTS
Since there are, to the best of our knowledge, no large-n
analyses of the New York Court of Appeals during the
period from 1900 to 1941, we begin this Part by providing
some relatively simple descriptive summaries of the court’s
aggregate decisions on a term-by-term basis.
We begin by looking at the court’s caseload. Throughout
this period, appeal to the court was a matter of right in a
case involving a nonunanimous decision by the appellate
division (the intermediate appellate court) or a reversal or
modification of a lower court decision. Appeal also was a
matter of right in capital cases and some constitutional
cases. In other cases, appeal was by permission, which could
8. Such coding misses cases in which agreement on the result masks
important disagreements about the rationale. For example, Fougera & Co. v.
City of New York, 120 N.E. 642 (N.Y. 1918), is treated as a unanimous case
because the majority and the concurring judges all voted to affirm the result
below. Andrew Kaufman describes the case as splitting the court 4-3 on the
important question of the constitutionality of a safety ordinance requiring that
sellers of patent or proprietary medicines register the active ingredients with
the department of health. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 367. The registry was
confidential. Id. Cardozo, writing for the majority, holds the ordinance
unconstitutional because it applied retroactively while stating that a prospective
ordinance would be valid. Id. at 368. The concurring judges would not permit
even a prospective ordinance. Id. at 367-68. Voting patterns in the case are
consistent with the dominant pattern in the 1917 term.
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be granted by the appellate division, by the New York Court
of Appeals, or by leave.9 Figure 1 plots the total number of
cases decided by the court in each term along with the
number of cases decided with written opinions. We code a
case as having a written opinion whenever the Lexis opinion
field has 150 or more words. Looking at Figure 1, we see
that the court’s caseload averaged about 600 cases per term
with some variability up to just over 700 cases per term and
down to about 400 cases per term in select years. There is
no appreciable trend to the caseload, although there was a
sharp downturn around 1920, which corresponds with the
court finally clearing a large backlog of cases that had built
up. Nonetheless, by the early 1930s the caseload was back
near the overall average of about 600 cases per term. Only a
fraction of these cases featured a written opinion of 150 or
more words—between 24% and 44% of cases, about 200
written opinions per year. To put these numbers into
perspective, the United States Supreme Court decided 92
cases in its 2009 term.

9. Charles S. Desmond, The Limited Jurisdiction of the New York Court of
Appeals—How Does it Work?, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1950) (providing an
overview and data on the frequency of different types of appeal by right and
appeal by permission, and by subject matter, during the periods indicated). In
1923 through 1924, of 500 cases that came to the court, 135 were by permission
of the New York Court of Appeals or the appellate division. Id. at 2-3. In all, 249
cases came by right based on a reversal, modification, or nonunanimous
affirmance by the appellate division. Id. at 3. The reported reversal rates in
appeals by right and appeals by permission are similar in both periods. Id.
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Figure 1. Total Number of Cases and Number of Cases with Written
Opinions Heard by the New York Court of Appeals from 1900 to 1940.

Figure 2 plots the fraction of all unanimous cases and
all unanimous cases with written opinions over this period.
Given this very high volume of cases, it is not surprising
that only a fraction had substantial written opinions.
During the period from 1900 to 1940, unanimous cases as a
fraction of all cases in each term hovered fairly steadily
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around 0.8 to 0.9 with an average of 0.86. No major
temporal trends are apparent in this series. The term-byterm fraction of cases with written opinions that were
decided unanimously is a noisier series (due to the much
smaller values of the denominator) but it, too, has a flat
trend. Not surprisingly, the cases with written opinions
were less likely to be decided unanimously. Approximately
62% and 87% of such cases were decided unanimously in
any given term with an average of 75%. There are a
significant number of nonunanimous cases in which there
are no substantial written opinions. There also are a
significant number of nonunanimous cases in which dissent
is noted but there are no dissenting opinions. This practice
seems to decline over time.10

10. Given the possibility of dissent without an opinion, what may be
surprising is the frequency in which dissenters made the effort to write an
opinion, as writing a dissent is a costly activity that has no direct legal impact.
Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis 3-4 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 510,
2010).
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Figure 2(a). Unanimity and Dissent on the New York Court of Appeals,
1900 to 1940.
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Figure 2(b). Unanimity and Dissent on the New York Court of Appeals,
1900 to 1940.

Not all nonunanimous decisions are created equal. A
world in which all dissents are sole dissents is qualitatively
different from a world in which all dissents are 4-3 splits.
Further, as a purely technical point, voting data (taken
alone) provides very little information when all of the
dissenting blocs are the same size. Thus we have some
interest in unpacking the dissents to see whether some
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voting splits are relatively infrequent or whether the size of
the dissenting bloc changes over time. Figure 2(b) presents
this information both for all cases and cases with written
opinions. Here we see that all three possible sizes of the
dissenting bloc occur at similar rates and that these rates,
while noisy, do not exhibit any noticeable temporal trend.
Thus it would appear that there is a fair amount of stability
in dissent behavior during this time period.
III. IDENTIFYING AND DEPICTING PATTERNED VOTING: THE
IRT MODEL
To this point, we have focused our attention on
aggregate patterns of behavior—the number of cases heard,
term-by-term dissent rates, etc. In this Part, we begin to
shift our attention to the individual behavior of the judges.
More precisely, our interest is patterns in agreement and
disagreement among judges. One can imagine a world in
which patterns of voting told us nothing interesting about
the underlying views and values of judges. Each judge
might have an individual propensity to dissent (perhaps due
to ability, strength of convictions, social pressures, etc.) with
each judge’s decision to join the majority or dissent being
independent of the decisions of the other six judges on the
court. Call this independent voting. In such a world, we
might still see patterns in voting—for example, we might
see Cardozo tends to agree with Lehman and to disagree
with Hiscock—but the patterns would be a random product
of independent voting. The voting data of the New York
Court of Appeals makes it possible to exclude this
hypothesis. As we explain in Appendix One, it is extremely
unlikely that the observed patterns of voting in the New
York Court of Appeals for the period under study are the
random product of independent voting.
This should come as no surprise. Contemporary
observers and historians often describe certain judges as
allies.11 Such accounts are based on what the judges reveal
about themselves in their written opinions or other
11. NELSON, supra note 4, at 21 (describing Lehman as “the close ally of . . .
Cardozo”); id. at 22 (describing Pound as Cardozo’s “regular ally”); KAUFMAN,
supra note 2, at 166-67 (stating “Cardozo liked and respected his colleagues, and
they liked and admired him,” but then going on to describe two recorded
incidents of testy exchanges between Cardozo and McLaughlin and Hiscock).
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writings, the recorded observations of contemporaries,
biographical data, and general historical data. We propose
to come at the question from an angle that, while crude, is
more systematic and less likely to be biased by
preconceptions about how and why judges disagree. We
start by looking for patterns in voting in nonunanimous
cases. We then look to see if we can identify differences in
the subject matter or views expressed in the cases that may
explain the observed patterns.
The threshold problem we confront is how to identify
and depict patterns in voting. We use a relatively simple
strategy—modeling judicial decisions in each term of the
court with a two-parameter item response theory (IRT)
model. Such models are consistent with a simple model of
preference-based voting.12 For our purposes they should be
viewed only as empirical summaries of observed behavior.13
Such models have been successfully applied to merits votes
from a variety of courts.14
These models assume that individual judge-specific
votes can be coded dichotomously and that the coding
decision is consistent across all judges voting on a case. As
noted above, we choose to code votes as a being in favor of
the majority position or not in favor of the majority position.
Given this coding scheme, the IRT model employed here
assumes that the probability judge j votes for the majority
position on case k is given by F(-ak + fkqj) where F(×) is the
standard normal distribution function and ak, fk, and qj are
parameters to be estimated. ak captures the propensity to
dissent on case k after accounting for fk, and qj. The f and q
parameters are of primary interest to us.
The parameter qj represents the ideal point of judge j. If
one favors a uni-dimensional preference-based voting
12. See, e.g., Joshua Clinton et al., The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (2004).
13. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 821-22 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Benjamin R.D. Alarie & Andrew Green, The Reasonable Justice:
An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of
Canada, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 195, 205-06, 225-26 (2007); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin
M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 69, 103-04
(2010); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134, 137, 152 (2002).
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interpretation of this model, then judge j’s ideal point can be
viewed as this judge’s most preferred policy position on the
latent dimension. If one uses the IRT model as a means of
data reduction and summarization, as we do, then judge j’s
ideal point (qj) is of interest primarily for its location
relative to the other judges’ ideal points. Ideal points that
are closer together imply greater voting agreement than do
ideal points that are farther apart.
Applying an IRT model to the United States Supreme
Court in the modern era produces clear results—i.e., the
estimated ideal points for the justices (q) are quite
distinct—because voting in nonunanimous cases tends to be
highly polarized along familiar ideological and political
lines. One thought we had going into this study is that
applying the IRT model to the decisions of the New York
Court of Appeals in the period we study might yield
muddled results because the court was, by all accounts, less
polarized and politicized for much of the period. That is not
what we found. In occasional terms, the IRT model does
produce muddled results. But in most terms it produces
fairly clear results. Further, for some periods these results
are stable across terms.
Figure 3 illustrates what we mean by clear and
muddled results—using the 1930 term as an example of
clear results and the 1931 term as an example of muddled
results. These plots represent the estimated probability that
each judge’s ideal point has a certain rank (left-most, second
from the left, third from the left, etc.). The tone of each
square codes the probability of a particular justice
occupying a particular position on the court, with darker
tones indicating increased certainty. In the 1931 term, the
estimated ideal points (q) for Crouch, Pound, Hubbs, and
J.F. O’Brien are essentially indistinguishable. The observed
data do not allow one to say much about the ranks of these
ideal points other than that any of these judges could be
anywhere from the third to the eighth judge from the left.
This produces the muddled results depicted in Figure 3(b).
On the other hand, the results for the 1930 term exhibit
much more clarity. Here, the observed data allow us to
recover the rank order of the judges ideal points with
relatively little uncertainty.
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Figure 3(a). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1930 and 1931 Terms.
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Figure 3(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1930 and 1931 Terms.

The results for the 1930 term do not imply that voting is
uni-dimensional during the term. They only indicate that
the IRT model is a meaningful way to capture associations
in voting. We will unpack the nonunanimous decisions from
the 1930 term a bit to provide a sense of the voting patterns
that can produce such results. There are sixty-one
nonunanimous decisions in the 1930 term. The IRT model
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captures that either Kellogg or Crane is most likely to be a
lone dissenter.15 It captures that in cases with two dissents,
the most likely dissenting pairs are Kellogg-O’Brien, CranePound, and Crane-Hubbs16 and that judges from opposite
wings rarely are a dissenting pair.17 It captures the most
frequent coalitions in 4-3 cases18 and that judges on opposite
wings are less likely to be in a coalition in such cases.19
While the model reveals patterns in voting that might
otherwise go unnoticed, some information is lost in the
process. Different sets of voting data can generate similar
results under the model. Thus, one cannot infer voting data
from results. One can only infer that there are likely to be
general patterns in the voting data. Appendix Two
addresses this point in a bit more detail and explains why it
does not undermine the descriptive accuracy of the model.
Up to now we have focused on the q parameters that
capture patterns of agreement and disagreement among
judges. We turn now to the case specific parameter fk. In
the IRT literature, this is commonly referred to as a
discrimination parameter.20 Under the model, fk can have a

15. There are sole dissents in twenty-four cases. Crane and Kellogg each had
six. Hubbs, O’Brien, and Pound each had three. Cardozo had two and Lehman
one.
16. There are twenty-two cases with two dissenters. The pairs indicated in
the text dissented in ten.
17. Kellogg and Hubbs join in dissent in three cases. There are no dual
dissents from the pairs Kellogg-Crane, O’Brien-Crane, or O’Brien-Hubbs.
18. There are fifteen 4-3 cases. In three, the court splits precisely as the
model indicates with no crossover voting. In two, Cardozo crosses over Pound to
join Crane and Hubbs. In two, Lehman crosses over Cardozo and Pound to join
Crane and Hubbs. The remaining eight cases are one-time coalitions.
19. Crane and Kellogg vote together in three of fifteen 4-3 cases, twice in
majority and once in dissent. Crane and O’Brien vote together in four cases.
Hubbs and O’Brien vote together in three cases. Hubbs and Kellogg vote
together in six cases. By comparison, Crane and Hubbs vote together in ten
cases. Kellogg and O’Brien also vote together in ten.
20. This terminology comes from educational testing literature where such
models were developed and are still commonly used. See, e.g., FRANK B. BAKER,
THE BASICS OF ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 22 (2001); FREDERIC M. LORD,
APPLICATIONS OF ITEM RESPONSE THEORY TO PRACTICAL TESTING PROBLEMS 13
(1980); WIM J. VAN DER LINDEN & RONALD K. HAMBLETON, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 88 (1997). In the context of an IRT model applied to test
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positive or negative value. We primarily are interested in
f’s absolute value. If the absolute value of fk in case k is
high, then the voting patterns in case k are well represented
by the model.21 If the absolute value of fk in case k is near 0,
then the voting patterns in case k are not well represented
by the model. The sign of fk in case k indicates which wing
of the court (as the wings are depicted by the model)
prevailed in case k when the absolute value of fk is high.
Thus when fk is large and positive, the ideal points of the
judges are highly predictive of their votes on case k with the
members of the majority having ideal points to the right of
the minority judges. Since our interest generally is the
disagreements among judges that produce patterned voting,
and not the results in a given case (i.e., which wing
prevailed), our interest is in the absolute value of f.
Voting data from the 1930 term illustrates how the
case-specific parameter fk correlates with how well the
model captures voting patterns in case k. There were sixtyone nonunanimous decisions. The ten cases with the highest
absolute f are 5-2 or 4-3 decisions (and one 4-2 decision) in
which the court splits precisely as the model predicts.22 The
next ten cases in value of absolute f are sole dissents by
Kellogg or Crane.23 In these twenty cases, there is no crossover voting. The next ten cases in value of absolute f
include coalitions imperfectly captured by the model, such
as three 4-3 cases in which Cardozo crosses over Lehman to
join Crane and Hubbs dissent.24 Conversely, cases in which
the absolute values of f are close to 0 are not well
represented by the model. During the 1930 term, the ten
cases with the lowest absolute value of f include six cases
with sole dissents by Cardozo, Lehman, or Pound, two 5-2

items coded as correct/incorrect, the value of fk tells researchers how well test
item k discriminates between high and low ability test takers.
21. For a similar analysis of votes based on the estimated f parameters see
Simon Jackman, Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian
Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference and Model Checking, 9 POL.
ANALYSIS 227, 228-30 (2001).
22. The range in absolute f is 2.722 to 2.443.
23. The range in absolute f is 2.35 to 2.193.
24. The range in absolute f is 2.176 to 1.667.
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cases in which Lehman and Pound dissent, and two 4-3
cases with unusual coalitions.25
IV. CHANGING PATTERNS OF VOTING AND DISAGREEMENT IN
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

In this Part, we look more closely at patterns of voting
in the New York Court of Appeals captured by the model
during selected terms and periods. We also offer some
tentative claims about the underlying differences in views
and values that produce such patterned voting. Behind
these claims is a more general methodological hypothesis:
when voting on a court is patterned, the characteristics of
cases in which voting best fits the pattern (i.e., cases with a
high absolute f) are likely to tell us something about the
underlying differences in views and values among the
judges that produce patterned voting. Our findings support
the methodological hypothesis. We find recurring
disagreements in the cases with highly patterned voting for
all periods we examine closely except the 1926 to 1930
terms. For the 1918 and 1921 to 1926 terms, these recurring
disagreements correspond to fundamental points of
disagreement between judges on the court that have been
observed by scholars using more conventional methods.
Importantly, the character of these recurring disagreements
changes over time. Our tentativeness largely goes to how to
describe these recurring disagreements.
A. The 1901 to 1904 Terms
The composition of the court was fairly stable during
the 1901 to 1904 terms. Ten judges served on the court at
some time during the four terms. Eight judges served all
four terms.26 Judson Landon served only in the 1901 term.27
Chief Justice Alton B. Parker served on the court through
the 1903 term. He resigned from the court in summer 1904
to run for the U.S. presidency as the Democratic candidate.28
Seven of the ten serving in the 1901 term were elected.
25. The range in absolute f is .004 to .294.
26. Cela W. Martin retired from the court in the middle of the 1904 term at
age 70 under a mandatory retirement rule. FRANCIS BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, 1847–1932, at 229 (1985).
27. He also retired at age 70. Id. at 225.
28. Id. at 226-29.
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Three served by appointment; they were Landon, Edgar M.
Cullen, and William E. Werner.29 They were appointed in
1900 by the governor under an 1899 amendment
authorizing the appointment of up to three judges from the
New York State Supreme Court (the trial court of general
jurisdiction) to assist the court with its workload. We
discerned no differences in the workload and voting
behavior of elected and appointed judges at any time. The
last year an appointed judge served was 1920.30
Appointment generally seems to have been a stepping stone
to an elected position. Cullen was appointed to replace
Parker as chief justice and was elected to a full fourteenyear term as the nominee of both major parties in 1904.31
Werner ran for a regular seat on the Republican ticket
against John Gray in 1902 and lost.32 He ran again in 1904
as the nominee of both major parties and was elected.33
Some judges continued to serve by appointment after failing
to gain elected seats.34
We fit the basic uni-dimensional IRT model discussed
above to the nonunanimous vote data from each term.
Figure 4 displays the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal
points for each term. Comparing the four terms side by side
illustrates some general phenomena that hold throughout
the forty-year period we study. Looking at the 1904 term,
note that the model was able to rank the judges on the
Edward Bartlett, Martin, and Vann wing of the court with a
high probability of their posterior rank between each other
as well as within the court as a whole. We will describe this
29. Throughout the period we study, the court had seven elected judges who
were elected for fourteen-year terms. Id. at 207-14. An 1899 constitutional
amendment authorized the governor to designate up to three additional judges
from the pool of judges elected to the New York State Supreme Court to assist
the court with its workload. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also BERGAN, supra
note 26, at 224-25. Cullen, Landon, and Werner were the first three judges
designed to the serve on the New York Court of Appeals. BERGAN, supra note 26,
at 225.
30. Id. at 261-62.
31. Id. at 229-30.
32. Id. at 225-26.
33. Id. at 229.
34. Werner continued to serve after his defeat in 1902. Id. at 226. Chase
continued to serve after he was defeated by Seabury in 1914. Id. at 253, 261.
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as highly patterned voting. Voting within the Denis,
O’Brien, Grey, and Cullen wing of the court is less
patterned in the 1904 term. Turning to the 1903 term, you
see highly patterned voting within the O’Brien, Gray, and
Parker wing of the court but not within the Bartlett,
Martin, and Vann wing. Turning to the 1901 term, there is
a fairly strong pattern of voting across all ten judges, but
there is a weak pattern in voting looking at the two major
clusters of judges. Finally, in the 1902 term there is
somewhat less pattern in the voting except that Bartlett,
Vann, and Martin predictably align on one wing apart from
the other six judges.
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Figure 4(a). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1901 to 1904 Terms.
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Figure 4(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1901 to 1904 Terms.
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Figure 4(c). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1901 to 1904 Terms.
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Figure 4(d). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1901 to 1904 Terms.
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Figure 4 illustrates there is some movement in posterior
ranks of judges across adjacent terms. Occasionally
movement across adjacent terms is quite significant. Denis
O’Brien anchors the wing of the court with Parker, Gray,
and Cullen except in the 1902 term, where he is situated
between the three judges solidly on the other wing (Bartlett,
Martin, and Vann) and the rest of the court. Such large
shifts in the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal points
across adjacent terms are infrequent, but they do occur.
Most movement across adjacent terms is as you see in
Figure 4. Judges who are in a cluster will swap positions.
For example, Werner, Haight, and Cullen stay together
while swapping positions. Not surprisingly, there is more
movement across greater spans of time. Sometimes there is
significant movement in adjacent terms when the
membership of the court changes. Later in this Article, we
present a striking example of this around the 1926 term.
The fuzziness in posterior ranks and movement across
adjacent terms without a change in membership may occur
for several reasons. To some extent it is a byproduct of the
limited number of nonunanimous decisions each term.35 The
IRT model assumes the voting behavior of judges is driven
by a single latent dimension. Plainly, this is false. Some
disagreements among judges will be for reasons that have
little or nothing to do with differences in views and values
that affect voting in a systematic way. Disagreements in
judgments that are largely factual in nature may have this
quality. Disagreements on purely technical legal issues may
also have this quality. Such voting is not random, but the
model assumes that such concerns are orthogonal to the
pattern captured by the model, and so, random from the
point of view of the model. The observed patterns in voting
indicate much voting is not random in this sense. Even if
disagreement in voting is a product of disagreements on
relatively stable underlying views and values, we would
expect some fuzziness and movement in posterior ranks.
Multiple views and values may influence judicial decision
making. Some of these views and values may be somewhat
interdependent, and may appear roughly uni-dimensional
in their combined effect on voting, but others will be more
35. There are ninety-eight nonunanimous decisions in the 1901 term, ninety
in the 1902 term, one hundred four in the 1903 term, and eighty-one in the 1904
term.

922

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

independent. Different views and values will dominate in
different types of cases. We see an example of this in the
1918 term where we find patterned voting that is quite
different from the dominant pattern in criminal cases. Thus,
a change in the mix of the cases may alter the posterior
ranks of judges. During the period from 1900 to 1920, a
randomly selected subset of judges who serve in a term will
vote in each case. The luck of the draw among cases may
alter posterior ranks.
While there is some fuzziness and movement in
posterior ranks of judges over the 1901 to 1904 terms, there
also is a great deal of clarity and stability in the posterior
ranks in each term and across terms. It is extraordinarily
unlikely such patterned voting occurs by coincidence.
Instead, it suggests that voting is being influenced by
differences in views and values of judges that are fairly
stable and that influence decisions across a significant
number of cases. While the IRT model assumes a single
dimension of difference, the model is agnostic as to what
this dimension might be. Our methodological hypothesis is
that an examination of the cases in which voting is most
patterned (i.e., the cases with a high absolute f) may
provide insight about the underlying disagreements in
views and values that produce patterned voting.
One thing is clear: the differences that divide the court
in the high absolute f cases in the 1901 to 1904 terms are
quite unlike the differences that divide the court in later
periods. The differences resist simple categorization, so we
will proceed by describing some high absolute f cases that
are suggestive of the recurring differences during the 1901
to 1904 terms. National Protective Ass’n of Steam Fitters &
Helpers v. Cumming36 poses the politically, economically,
socially, and legally fraught question of whether an action
in tort lies against a labor union for interfering with the
employment of nonunion workers by refusing to allow its
members to work alongside nonunion workers and
threatening to strike if they were not discharged.37 The
court splits 4-3 holding the union is not liable in tort.38
Parker, O’Brien, Haight, and Gray are in the majority, with
36. 63 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1901) (f = -3.014).
37. Id. at 372.
38. Id. at 374.
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Parker writing for the majority that workers had the right
to combine and threaten to withhold services to secure
better terms of employment so long as they did not act out
of malice.39 Vann, Bartlett, and Martin dissent.40 They take
a position alongside the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in 1900 (over a dissent by Holmes) and a conservative
House of Lords in 1901 that such combined conduct is
actionable.41
While voting in a case like Steam Fitters seems
inevitably to have a political dimension, other high absolute
f cases show that the differences between the Vann,
Bartlett, and Martin wing of the court from the O’Brien,
Gray, and Parker wing are not solely or even primarily
political in the ordinary sense of the term. Monnier v. New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R.42 is an assault and battery
claim brought by a train passenger who was expelled from a
train after refusing to pay a four cent surcharge to purchase
a ticket.43 The passenger refused to pay the surcharge on the
train for the valid reason that the ticket office was closed in
the station where he boarded the train.44 The court denies
the claim splitting 4-3. The majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions all agree that the question at the bottom
is whether the passenger’s claim of right should yield to
“process and resort to proper proceedings.”45 The majority
(O’Brien, Parker, and Haight) and concurring judge (Cullen)
take the position that the passenger should have paid the
four cents and not made such a bother over a contested
claim of a trivial right.46 Bartlett, Martin, and Vann
dissent.47 They take the position that “[t]he plaintiff and
defendant were each bound in the emergency to determine

39. Id. at 369.
40. Id. at 380.
41. Id. at 379-80 (Vann, J., dissenting).
42. 67 N.E. 569 (1903) (f = -2.963).
43. Id. at 569-70.
44. Id. at 570.
45. Id. at 572; id. at 572 (Cullen, J., concurring); id. at 573 (Bartlett, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. at 570-72; id. at 572 (Cullen, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 573.
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the character of his or its legal rights . . . at their peril.”48
Their wing is in the majority in another case involving a
conflict between a rail passenger and an overbearing
conductor. In Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.,49 Martin,
Bartlett, Haight, and Cullen join to hold that a railway may
be liable for the emotional distress suffered by a passenger
who is verbally humiliated by a conductor.50 Gray, Parker,
and O’Brien dissent.51
A significant number of high absolute f cases involve
personal injury claims. In these cases, the Bartlett, Martin,
and Vann wing always votes for the plaintiff. There is a
range of issues in these cases. Most turn on narrow legal or
factual issues.52 Some of the cases are decided per curiam
without any opinion. In some there is a dissenting opinion,
which is unusual for that period. At least one case53 turns on
a question of general importance: whether negligence in
wiring a building had to be established on the state of the art

48. Id. at 573 (Cullen, J., concurring).
49. 70 N.E. 857, 863 (N.Y. 1904) (f = 3.022).
50. Id. at 863.
51. Id.
52. Green v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 63 N.E. 958, 958-59 (N.Y. 1902) (f = 3.099), is a 4-3 decision reversing a jury verdict for a boy injured by a railcar on
the ground that it was error to exclude a physician’s testimony regarding what
the boy had told him regarding the cause of the accident. The court split on
whether the boy’s statement to the physician was privileged under a statute
privileging communications made for purpose of treatment. Id. Martin, Vann,
and Werner joined in dissent. Id. at 960. Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit, 63
N.E. 836, 838-39 (N.Y. 1902) (f = -3.03), is a 4-3 decision reversing summary
judgment for the plaintiff in a rail crossing accident on the ground that the issue
of contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury. Bartlett,
Martin, and Vann dissent. Id. at 845. Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 64 N.E. 501,
502 (N.Y. 1902) (f = 2.66), is a 4-3 decision affirming a judgment for the plaintiff
in a slip and fall case. Bartlett, Martin, Vann, and Cullen are in the majority.
Id. at 504. Gray, Parker, and O’Brien dissent. Id. Howard v. Ludwig, 64 N.E.
172, 173-74 (N.Y. 1902) (f = 2.641), is a 4-3 decision affirming a judgment for
the plaintiff on negligence claim where the issue was whether the driver was
acting as the defendant’s servant. Bartlett, Martin, Vann, and Haight are in the
majority. Id. at 175. Gray, O’Brien, and Parker dissent. Id.
53. Herzog v. Mun. Elec. Light Co., 72 N.E. 1142, 1142 (N.Y. 1904) (per
curiam) (f = -3.083) (sustaining summary judgment for the defendant in a 4-3
per curiam decision).
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at the time the wiring was done.54 Four judges on the court’s
left-wing vote to sustain the appellate division answering
this question yes.55 Bartlett, Martin, and Vann dissent.56
In several high absolute f cases involving commercial
transactions and real estate conveyances, the Bartlett,
Martin, and Vann wing of the court takes a flexible
approach in applying rules to reach an arguably fair result
on the facts. The other wing of the court opts for the result
that advances the interests of certainty and predictability.57
Two other high absolute f cases stand out. In one, the issue
was whether a water company had a right to an injunction
54. Herzog v. Mun. Elec. Light Co., 85 N.Y.S 712, 714-15 (N.Y. App. Div.
1904), aff’d per curiam, 72 N.E. 1142 (N.Y. 1904) (f = -3.083).
55. Herzog, 72 N.E. at 1142-43.
56. Id.
57. In Uihlein v. Matthews, 64 N.E. 792, 793-94 (N.Y. 1902) (f = -2.916), the
court holds that the parol evidence rule bars consideration of strong evidence
that a quit claim deed given in resolution of a controversy over boundary was
not meant by the parties to absolve the grantee of a restriction on the use of
property (it could not be used for a saloon) earlier imposed by the grantor in
conveying the right to use three inches of land and a party wall. The suit was
against a successor who acquired the property with knowledge of the restriction.
Id. at 793. Bartlett writes a dissent joined by Martin and Vann. Id. at 796.
Cullinan v. Bowker, 72 N.E. 911, 912-13 (N.Y. 1904) (f = -3.025), holds that an
agent could not give a clerk the power to execute a bond, even though everyone
proceeded on the assumption had the power, where the instruments giving the
agent his authority and the bonds themselves made it clear to the plaintiff that
a bond had to be executed by the agent. Vann writes a dissent in which Bartlett
and Martin join. Id. at 916. Critten v. Chemical Nat’l Bank, 63 N.E. 969, 972
(N.Y. 1902) (f = -2.467), holds that the loss from forged checks is cast on the
account-holder whose name was forged when the account-holder had notice of
the forgery in time stop it because previously forged checks had been returned
to it. Vann and Bartlett dissent taking the position that the general rule of
constructive notice should not apply when the agent of the account holder who
received the notice was the forger himself. Id. at 974-75 (Vann, J., dissenting).
Stecher Lithographic v. Inman, 67 N.E. 213, 213-14 (N.Y. 1903) (f = 2.228),
holds that a statement by a third party regarding the sufficiency of performance
of a contract was admissible when an agent of the party opposing admission of
the statement did not object to the statement at the time it was made. Bartlett,
Martin, and Vann are in the majority this time because Haight joins them. Id.
at 216. Parker writes a dissent in which Gray and O’Brien concur. Id. The gist
of Parker’s argument in dissent is that the case is not within the rare situations
in which a statement of third party is treated as an admission and that not
correcting the erroneous admission of the statement would “establish an
unfortunate precedent.” Id. at 214-15 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
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to enable it to lay pipes underneath a city street without the
city’s consent and over its objections.58 The majority answers
the question yes based on a close technical analysis of the
relevant contracts and statutes.59 Bartlett writes a dissent
in which Martin and Vann join.60 After taking on the
majority’s technical arguments, Bartlett argues that the
water company had an ulterior and illegal motive for
seeking the power to lay the pipes, which was to put itself in
a position to compete with the city as a water supplier.61 In
the dissenters’ view, such bad faith justified denying the
injunction whatever the company’s technical rights.62
Finally, there is a franchise tax case on the question of
whether capital invested in real estate, held for investment
or lease, is “employed within this state,” and so subject to
the franchise tax.63 In a 1904 decision, a 4-3 majority bows
to precedent and holds the capital is not subject to the
franchise tax.64 In 1905, the result flips with Bartlett, Vann,
Haight, and Werner finding a way to distinguish the
precedent.65 Strikingly, the dissent of the court’s left-wing in
the 1905 case is very much about the importance of having
clear, dependable rules.66
What we perceive of as the recurring point of
disagreement in which voting is patterned during the 1901
to 1904 terms is unlike what we find in later terms,
including the 1910 and 1911 terms. In the 1901 to 1904
terms, what the model describes as the court’s right-wing
consistently takes a moralistic position in high absolute f
cases. The judges on this wing show themselves willing to
bend the law to reach results they feel to be just. The court’s
58. Rochester & L.O. Water Co. v. City of Rochester, 68 N.E. 117, 117 (N.Y.
1903) (f = -2.503).
59. Id. at 119-21.
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id. at 125-26 (Bartlett, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. People ex rel. Ft. George Realty Co. v. Miller, 71 N.E. 463, 463 (N.Y. 1904)
(f = -2.293).
64. Id. at 463-64. Martin, Bartlett, and Vann dissent. Id. at 464.
65. People ex rel. Wall & H. St. Realty Co. v. Miller, 73 N.E. 1102, 1103, 1106
(N.Y. 1905) (f = 2.501).
66. Id. at 1106 (Cullen, C.J., Gray, O’Brien, J.J., dissenting).
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left-wing takes a more pragmatic and prudential approach.
The pragmatists put a higher value on having certain and
predictable rules.
One famous low absolute f from the 1903 term
warrants mention before we move on. The court split 4-3 in
People v. Lochner,67 narrowly upholding a law setting
maximum hours for workers in a bakery that the United
States Supreme Court later held to violate substantive due
process.68 Whatever may have been the differences in values
and views that divided the New York Court of Appeals in
Lochner, they do not appear to correspond with the
differences that divided the court in most cases in which
they divided during this period.69
B. The 1910 and 1911 Terms
We look closely at the 1910 and 1911 terms because
probably the most important decision of the court politically
during the forty-year period we study is from the 1910 term.
This is Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co.,70 in which a unanimous
court held the New York workmen’s compensation statute
unconstitutional.71 The reaction to Ives led to significant
changes in the membership of the court.72 As you will see,
67. 69 N.E. 373, 380 (N.Y. 1904) (f = .505) (Gray, Haight, and Parker were in
the majority, while Bartlett, Martin, and O’Brien joined in the dissent), rev’d,
Lochner v. New York, 19 U.S. 45 (1905).
68. Lochner, 19 U.S. at 64-65.
69. See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 364-65 (observing the lack of patterned
voting in cases involving constitutional challenges to economic and social
regulation).
70. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). Werner wrote the opinion for the court. Id.
Cullen wrote a concurring opinion in which Willard Bartlett joined. Id. at 44950 (Cullen, C.J., concurring).
71. Id. at 448.
72. BERGAN, supra note 26, at 245-47 (attributing Werner’s loss to Bartlett in
1913 race for Chief Judge to hostile public reaction to decision). Witt supplies
details, noting that Werner lost the support of the Progressive Party when he
refused to repudiate his decision in Ives and that the votes cast for Learned
Hand, the Progressive nominee, swamped the margin by which Werner lost.
WITT, supra note 5, at 177-78. Seabury’s public criticism of Ives may have helped
him gain the support of the Democratic Party in 1914, which helped him defeat
Chase. Id. at 252-53. Ironically, this criticism may have led to Cardozo’s
selection over Seabury in 1914. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 128 (noting “several

928

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

the view that liability for accidental harm is fault-based
that was uncontested in Ives appears as a recurring point of
disagreement in the 1918 term and continues through the
mid-1920s. We find what would later come to be described
as an explicitly realist turn in the rhetoric of one wing of the
court in the 1918 term and thereafter. We see nothing like
this in the 1910 and 1911 terms. While the dramatic
changes in the character of the disagreements occur around
the 1918 term, there are discernible differences in the
underlying points of disagreement in the 1901 to 1904
terms and the 1910 and 1911 terms. The 1910 and 1911
terms provide another window on common law decision
making while styles of reasoning associated with formalism
dominated.
The membership of the court is stable in the 1910 and
1911 terms. There are seven elected and two appointed
judges.73 Figure 5 depicts the posterior rank of the judges’
ideal points for each term. The patterns of voting are
weaker than they were in the 1901 through 1904 terms,
particularly in the 1910 term.74 Still there are some
constants. Chief Justice Cullen and Willard Bartlett are
distinctly on one wing of the court both terms. Hiscock is
distinctly on the other. Werner tends to ally with Cullen
and Bartlett. Chase and Vann tend to ally with Hiscock.
Gray is consistently in the center. Collin and Haight move
around.

judges of the New York Court of Appeals opposed Seabury’s nomination because
Seabury had publicly branded the court as reactionary for its decision in the Ives
case.”).
73. Chase and Hiscock served by appointment both terms. BERGAN, supra
note 26, at 231.
74. This may partly be attributable to the abnormally low number of
nonunanimous decisions during the 1910 term (there were fifty-five). On the
other hand, the results for the 1909 term are even more muddled, with seventyfour nonunanimous decisions.
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Figure 5(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1910 to 1911 Terms.
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Turning to the high absolute f cases, we find a number
of cases in which the Cullen, Willard Bartlett, and Werner
wing takes striking positions. In Admiral Realty Co. v. City
of New York,75 Cullen and Werner read separate dissents76
to a 4-2 decision allowing New York City to use public funds
to expand the subway system interconnecting new public
lines with the existing private lines.77 Hiscock’s majority
opinion emphasizes the need to extend and unify the
subway system and the inability of the city to accomplish
this end by other means.78 Cullen and Werner will have
none of it. Werner concedes the merits of the city’s plan but
counters, “the plain duty of the courts is to uphold the
Constitution as it is written, even though it may be, for the
time being, a hindrance to beneficent results.”79 Willard
Bartlett, joined by Cullen, takes a similar stance in his
dissent in Moynahan v. City of New York80 with much less
momentous stakes. The court held 5-2 that a trial judge has
the inherent power to order a stenographic record be made
of proceedings at the public charge.81 Willard Bartlett
dissents writing:
Stenography is a modern innovation in our courts of law. To say
that the power to order the stenographic minutes of a trial inheres
in the court is to say that it has always existed, which is contrary
to the fact, or that it necessarily grows out of some pre-existing
82
power, which I cannot see and do not concede.

In two high absolute f cases, the Cullen, Willard
Bartlett, and Werner wing is part of a majority that narrowly
construes recent statutes to preserve long-standing,
restrictive procedural rules over dissents by the opposite
wing of the court.83 In another high absolute f case with a 4-3
75. 99 N.E. 241 (N.Y. 1912) (f = 2.463).
76. Id. at 250 (Cullen, J., dissenting); id. at 255 (Werner, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 244, 249-50.
78. Id. at 246. Collin, Haight, and Vann join Hiscock. Id. at 258.
79. Id. at 257 (Werner, J., dissenting).
80. 98 N.E. 482 (N.Y. 1911) (f = 2.778) (denying the court’s power to order
stenographic minutes at trial); id. at 486-87 (Bartlett, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 484-85.
82. Id. at 486-87.
83. See Brisbane v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 98 N.E. 752, 753-54 (N.Y. 1912) (f
= -2.524) (ruling in a 4-3 decision to narrowly construe a recent general
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split, the underlying disagreement appears to be over
whether New York courts should bother to hear a claim
asking them to resolve a highly technical issue under New
York law that might never be of any practical relevance to
the outcome of an Ohio dispute over a will.84 Chase dissents,
joined by Hiscock and Gray, writing, “[w]ith the crowded
condition of our courts we should not unnecessarily assume
jurisdiction” to advise an Ohio court.85 Cullen responds for
the majority, joined by Willard Bartlett, Haight, and Vann,
writing, “[i]f the question whether the plaintiffs are now
seised in fee of an undivided interest in the real estate is not
a practical one, pray what would be such?”86 In all of these
cases, the Cullen, Willard Bartlett, and Werner wing takes
what could be described as a strongly legalistic position while
the Hiscock and Chase wing takes a more pragmatic
position.87
It is difficult to ascribe any political valance to the
dominant voting patterns in the 1910 and 1911 terms. If we
described the position of Cullen, Willard Bartlett, and
Werner based on the judges with whom they tend to align in
other terms, then we would describe them as the left or
progressive wing of the court.88 Looking forward, in three of
jurisdiction statute to preserve the rule that New York courts do not have
jurisdiction over tort claims arising out of the state); Pouch v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 97 N.E. 731, 732-33 (N.Y. 1912) (f = -2.257) (ruling in a 5-2 to
narrowly construe a contemporary statute to deny availability of interpleader).
84. Monypeny v. Monypeny, 95 N.E. 1, 1-2 (N.Y. 1911) (f = -2.117).
85. Id. at 5 (Chase, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2.
87. See, e.g., Robinson v. Martin, 93 N.E. 488, 488 (N.Y. 1910) (f = 2.27613)
(discussing in a 4-3 decision whether a term in a will devising the remainder in
a trust established for the testator’s son to his “unmarried daughters” at the
time of his son’s death is an illegal restraint on marriage). Cullen, joined by
Bartlett and Haight, argues in dissent that it is, invoking the weight of
authority that conditions restraining marriage are void. Id. at 491 (Cullen, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority upholds the restriction, noting the confusion in the
law and the lack of any justification for not respecting the testator’s wishes if he
did not intend the limitation to discourage his daughters from marrying and it
did not have that practical effect. Id. at 491.
88. See WITT, supra note 5, at 152-86 (providing a nuanced account of the
political and judicial views of Werner, who wrote the opinion for the court in
Ives). According to Witt, Werner was a Lincoln republican with “(small-d)
democratic tastes” who was “turned off by excesses of wealth.” Id. at 156-57.
Werner found the life of a judge somewhat stultifying, but became imbued with
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the four terms Cardozo and Willard Bartlett serve together,
they have a strong tendency to vote together and against
Hiscock and Chase. Looking backward, Cullen and Werner
generally align with Parker and Denis O’Brien in the terms
they serve together. In a handful of high absolute f cases
from the 1910 and 1911 terms, their wing takes what most
would describe as progressive positions. Thus, in the four
high absolute f personal injury cases from the 1910 term,
the Willard Bartlett, Cullen, and Werner wing always sides
with the plaintiff.89 In a 4-3 case from the 1910 term on
whether a liability limitation on discount tickets shields a
carrier from liability for negligence, their wing of the court
sides with the passengers in a dissent arguing that terms
limiting liability should be construed narrowly.90
Willard Bartlett, Cullen, and Werner are no less
inclined than judges on the opposite wing to invalidate
legislation.91 Indeed, in the three high absolute f cases from
the 1910 and 1911 terms involving constitutional challenges
to legislation, their wing votes to invalidate. One of these
cases is Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York,92 which was
a challenge to New York’s use of public funds to expand the
subway system and interconnect private lines.93 In a case
from the 1910 term, the court split 4-2 in invalidating as
the “theory of the heroic guardian judge,” a “warrior[] against the encroachments
of combination, class legislation, and paternalism.” Id. at 159-60.
89. See Wilson v. Wyckoff, Church & Partridge, 93 N.E. 1135, 1135 (N.Y.
1911) (per curiam) (f = -2.401) (ruling for the plaintiff in a 5-2 decision with
Bartlett, Cullen, and Werner in the majority and Werner absent); Brown v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 94 N.E. 1092, 1092 (N.Y. 1911) (per curiam) (f = -2.284)
(4-3 decision); Hungerford v. Village of Waverly, 93 N.E. 1122, 1122 (N.Y. 1910)
(per curiam) (f = 2.124) (5-1 decision, with Willard Bartlett not voting); Kircher
v. Iron Clad Mfg. Co., 94 N.E. 1095, 1095 (N.Y. 1911) (f = -2.065) (per curiam)
(4-3 decision).
90. Gardiner v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 94 N.E. 876, 879-80 (N.Y. 1911). The
dissent is by Vann who is joined by Cullen and Willard Bartlett. Id. at 880.
91. The paucity of high f cases involving constitutional challenges to social
and political legislation bears out Andrew Kaufman’s observation of decisions
prior to 1914. “When persuasive arguments were made in favor of [freedom of
contract and protecting the public welfare] the court was nearly always split,
often in unpredictable ways, and the pattern of results was eclectic, almost
erratic.” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 365.
92. 99 N.E. 241 (N.Y. 1912).
93. Id. at 244.
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outside the police power a statute requiring transient
vendors who purport to sell goods that are acquired from a
bankrupt company or that are damaged by water or fire to
obtain a license.94 Chase and Hiscock dissent.95 In a case
from the 1911 term, the court split on a challenge to two
provisions of a law replacing the old convention system for
nominating party candidates with a new primary system.96
Cullen’s dissent is a passionate warning against
paternalism and excessive regulation.97 But it is not
accurate to describe their position as favoring private
interests over public or against regulation per se. In the
case involving licensing vendors, they object to the
regulation as anticompetitive and harmful to consumers. 98
Cullen’s dissent in the challenge to the law that set up a
primary system champions popular democracy while railing
94. People ex rel. Moskowitz v. Jenkins, 94 N.E. 1065, 1066-67 (N.Y. 1911) (f
= -2.018).
95. Id. at 1068.
96. Hopper v. Britt, 98 N.E. 86, 87-88 (N.Y. 1912) (f = 2.503). Under the first
challenged provision, the party emblem appeared on the primary ballot
alongside the name of the committee candidate, indicating he was the official
party candidate. Id. at 87. Under the second challenged provision, a candidate’s
name could appear only once, even though multiple groups nominated him. Id.
The trial court held both provisions invalid. See Hopper v. Britt, 133 N.Y.S. 778,
778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912), aff’d, 98 N.E. 86 (N.Y. 1912). The appellate division
held the first valid and the second invalid. Id. at 779-80. The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the appellate division 4-2. Hopper, 98 N.E. at 89. The model
gave the case a high f because Collin and Cullen dissented with four judges to
the right of Collin forming the majority. Id. at 88-89. This is a bit misleading as
Collin dissented on the part of the decision invalidating the second provision
while Cullen dissented on the part upholding the first provision. Id.
97. Cullen noted the following regarding paternalism and excessive
regulation:
The great misfortune of the day is the mania for regulating all human
conduct by statute, from responsibility for which few are exempt, since
many of our most intelligent and highly educated citizens, who resent
as paternalism and socialism legislative interference with affairs in
which they are interested, are most persistent in the attempt to
regulate by law the conduct of others. The great mass of such laws,
wise or unwise, it is within the power of the Legislature to enact. But
the limits of that power, in my judgment, are passed when public
officers assume to dictate to their masters, the electors, the principle on
which the latter shall choose them. Id. at 89 (Cullen, C.J., dissenting).
98. Moskowitz, 94 N.E. at 1066-67.
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against political elites telling the people how they should
choose their candidates.99
In both periods we have examined to this point, the
recurring disagreements in cases in which voting is most
highly patterned appear to be more legal than political or
social. In the 1901 through 1904 terms, the recurring
disagreement is between judges who take a moralistic view
of the law and judges who take a more pragmatic and
prudential view. In the 1910 through 1911 terms, the
recurring disagreement is between judges who take a more
legalistic view and judges who take a more pragmatic view.
As we shall see, matters change significantly in the coming
years as the membership of the court changes. Five of the
eight judges who served during these terms depart the court
by 1916. During this same period, ten new judges join the
court. Three of these come and go by 1915. By 1918 the
membership stabilizes and includes a core of six judges who
will serve together for a decade. Cardozo is among them.
C. The 1918 Term
We dig deeply into the 1918 term because patterns of
voting and recurring points of disagreement emerge that
continue and are sharply unlike what we observed in prior
terms. Ten judges cast votes in the 1918 term. Figure 6
displays the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal points.
Looking at Figure 6, we see that McLaughlin anchors one
end of the court while Hogan, Pound, and Cardozo anchor
the other.100 Looking only at nonunanimous votes cast in the
1918 term, one gets the sense that voting on the New York
Court of Appeals is highly patterned with Cardozo, Pound,
and Hogan on one wing of the court and Hiscock, Collin,
Chase, and McLaughlin on the other.101 When we say voting
is highly patterned we mean that the ideal points of judges
from one wing of the court are well-separated from the ideal
99. Hopper, 98 N.E. at 88-89.
100. Note that what is “right” and what is “left” is completely arbitrary. As is
standard with these sorts of models, we constrain two judges that rarely agree
with each other to have ideal points on the opposite sides of 0. Here those judges
are Cardozo and McLaughlin.
101. The posterior ranks of the judges are fairly stable from 1917 on. The
posterior ranks from the 1915 and 1916 terms are quite different.

936

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

points of judges on the other wing of the court. Indeed, in
1918 it is also the case that there is a bloc of centrists—
Andrews, Crane, and Cuddeback—who are reasonably wellseparated from the judges at either wing of the court.

Figure 6. Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1918 Term.
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Again we proceed on the assumption that reading high
f cases provides an insight on the underlying differences in
views and values that produce such patterned voting. 102 A
large number of the cases in which the alignment of judges
corresponds with the predicted alignment (i.e., high
absolute f cases) are in the general category of personal
injury claims, in which we include workmen’s compensation
claims. Judges on the Hogan and Pound wing of the court
generally vote for the plaintiff while judges on the
McLaughlin wing of the court generally vote for the
defendant.103 Often in these cases there is no written
opinion. A majority affirming the appellate division will do
so per curiam with the dissenting judges merely noting
their disagreement.104 The other cases in the 1918 term in
102. As noted above, a decision with a high absolute value of f fits the
predicted pattern. A famous example is Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639, 642
(N.Y. 1918) (f = -2.781), where Hogan, Pound, Cardozo, and Crane are in the
majority and Hiscock, Collins, and Andrews dissent. A decision with a low
absolute value of f does not fit the predicted pattern. A famous example from
the 1917 term is Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917)
(f = 0.597), where Cardozo, Cuddeback, McLaughlin, and Andrews are in the
majority and Hiscock, Chase, and Crane are in dissent. In the 1918 term, there
were one hundred eight decisions with a dissent. The maximum absolute value
for f was 2.935. Absolute f was greater than 2.0 in thirty-six cases and less than
.5 in eighteen cases.
103. Routinely does not mean always. In one low f decision, Skrodanes v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 123 N.E. 890, 890 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = -0.263),
McLaughlin joins Hogan, Crane, and Cuddeback in a 4-3 per curiam affirmance
of a decision for the plaintiff in a workplace negligence claim. Hiscock, Chase,
and Collin dissent. Id. The case is unlike those collected in the following note
because there was no disagreement below either between the appellate division
and special term (the trial court) or within the appellate division.
104. See, e.g., Dugan v. Harry J. McArdle, Inc., 122 N.E. 879, 879 (N.Y. 1919)
(per curiam) (f = 2.935) (Hogan, Cardozo, and Pound dissent to per curiam
affirmance of decision reversing worker’s compensation award); Guida v. Pa. Ry.
Co., 121 N.E. 871, 871 (N.Y. 1918) (f = 2.764) (per curiam) (Hogan and Crane
dissent to per curiam affirmance of decision reversing worker’s compensation
award); Kolb v. Brummer, 123 N.E. 874, 874 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = 2.587)
(Hogan, Cuddeback, and Crane dissent to per curiam affirmance of decision
reversing worker’s compensation award); Zenner v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co.,
122 N.E. 895, 895 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = 2.471) (Cardozo and Pound
dissent to per curiam affirmance of decision for defendant in negligence claim);
Latronica v. S. Blvd. R.R. Co., 123 N.E. 875, 875 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = 2.461) (Chase and McLaughlin dissenting to per curiam affirmance of decision
for plaintiff in personal injury case).
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which the judges split strongly on the predicted lines in
affirming the appellate division without opinions are two
insurance cases,105 an employment case,106 and a utility rate
case.107 The Hogan and Pound wing sides with the insured,
the employee, and the rate payers. In many of these cases
there is a disagreement below, either within the appellate
division or between the appellate division and the trial
court or the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. These
are cases where the appeal is a matter of right and not
leave. In almost all of these cases, the issue is a factual or
technical legal issue of no apparent general relevance.108 The
decision not to write opinions probably is explained by the
heavy workload of the court. Until the early 1920s the court
had a large backlog of cases. The practice appears to be for
the majority to write an opinion if they reverse the
105. Wikoff v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 123 N.E. 894, 894-95 (N.Y. 1919) (per
curiam) (f = -2.917) (Hiscock, Chase, and McLaughlin dissent to per curiam
affirmance of decision for insured on accident policy on the issue of whether
claim was covered by exclusion for hazardous employment); Goldstein v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 124 N.E. 898, 898 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = 2.774)
(Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews dissent to per curiam affirmance of decision for
insurer denying life insurance claim on ground policy was fraudulently
obtained). There are two similar high f insurance cases in the 1919 term.
Bollard v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 N.E. 900, 900 (N.Y. 1920) (f = 2.987) (per
curiam) (Hogan, Pound, and Elkus dissent to per curiam affirmance of decision
for insurer denying life insurance claim on the ground that the policy was
fraudulently obtained); Pataki v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 127 N.E. 917, 917
(N.Y.1920) (per curiam) (f = 2.936) (Cardozo, Pound, and Crane dissent to per
curiam affirmance of decision for insurer denying accident insurance claim on
the ground that the policy was fraudulently obtained).
106. O’Connor v. City of New York, 121 N.E. 881, 881 (N.Y. 1918) (per curiam)
(f = 2.898) (Hogan, Cardozo, and Pound dissent to per curiam affirmance of
decision against policeman contesting basis for calculating pension).
107. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Iroquois Natural Gas., 123 N.E. 885, 886 (N.Y.
1919) (per curiam) (f = 2.74) (Hogan and Crane dissent to per curiam
affirmance of decision denying Public Service Commission’s request for
injunction to a rate increase pending its approval).
108. In Dugan, the issues are whether the employer’s business was storage
and whether the employer and insurer were prejudiced by inadequate notice.
122 N.E. at 879. In Guida, the issue is whether the employee was engaged in
interstate commerce and so outside the scope of workmen’s compensation. 121
N.E. at 871. In Kolb, the issue is whether a workmen’s compensation policy was
in force at the time of the accident. 123 N.E. at 874. In Zenner, the issue is
whether the plaintiff’s conduct is contributory negligence as a matter of law. 122
N.E. at 895.
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appellate division. Typically in such nonunanimous cases
there is a majority opinion and dissents will be noted
without opinion.
To get some sense as to whether these patterns are
representative of all the 1918 term cases we plot the
presence of three case characteristics—whether the case
had a personal injury component, whether there was a
dissent at the appellate division, and whether there was
disagreement between the appellate division and the New
York State Supreme Court—on the case’s value of f. To aid
visualization, we superimpose a nonparametric estimate of
the probability of the attribute in question—say, a personal
injury component—given f. If a particular type of case tends
to be well represented by the model, then we should see a
U-shaped relationship. These plots appear in Figure 7. One
fact apparent from Figure 7 is that there are a significant
number of cases where the appeal is not by right.
Figure 7 reinforces the impression that whatever the
differences in underlying views and values may be that
produce highly patterned voting, these differences
correspond with differences in views that affect how judges
vote in personal injury cases. The U-shaped curve in the
upper-left panel of Figure 7(a) shows that personal injury
cases are disproportionately among the cases with a high
absolute f, these being the cases in which the pattern of
voting is most consistent with the model. The top-right
panel also shows a very strong U-shaped relationship
between f and whether there was a dissent at the appellate
division. The bottom-left panel shows a similar, albeit
muted, relationship between f and whether there was
disagreement among the lower courts (i.e, whether the
appellate division reversed or modified the lower court’s
ruling). Even more striking are the patterns that emerge
when looking at personal injury cases with and without
either an appellate division dissent or lower court
disagreement. These are cases where the appeal is by leave
and not as a matter of right. There is basically no
relationship between f and an indicator of personal injury
and lack of appellate division dissent or between f and an
indicator of personal injury and a lack of lower court
disagreement. On the other hand, there are very strong Ushaped relationships between f and an indicator of personal
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injury and presence of appellate division dissent or between
f and an indicator of personal injury and a presence of
lower court disagreement. One possible explanation for
these patterns is that Appellative Division dissent and
lower court disagreement are acting as proxies for the
underlying difficulty of the case—the extent to which each
side to the dispute has seemingly compelling legal reasons
to support its position. Cases that are difficult for the lower
courts are likely also difficult for the New York Court of
Appeals. In such situations, some degree of dissent is not
unlikely. Important, however, is the fact that in personal
injury cases these dissents are highly patterned in the sense
that they tend to form around very similar voting blocs. It is
not a stretch to think that this stability is related to
fundamental disagreements about the role of law in settling
such disputes. On the other hand, when there is not some
form of disagreement below the New York Court of Appeals,
the case in question may well be a relatively easy case in
which there is little room for judicial discretion. The
dissents in these cases, to the extent there are many
dissents, are likely due to a range of idiosyncratic factors
and thus are not well represented by the IRT model.
Personal injury cases stand out in another respect in
the 1918 term. Nonunanimous decisions are significantly
more likely in a personal injury case. Based on a sample of
fifty unanimous cases from the 1918 term, we estimate
33.7% of personal injury cases were nonunanimous
compared to 12.6% of other cases.109 The presence of a
personal injury component nearly triples the probability of a
dissent in a case.

109. Flipping this around, 14.3% of unanimous cases were personal injury
cases while 37% of nonunanimous cases were personal injury cases.
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Figure 7(a). Relationship Between Personal Injury Cases, Appellate
Division Dissent, Lower Court Disagreement, and f in 1918. Each point
is a nonunanimous case from the 1918 term. On the y-axis is an
indicator of whether the case in question was of the type labeled (1 if it
was, 0 if not). The x-axis plots the value of f for the case. The dark line
is a loess smooth which estimates the probability that that a randomly
selected cases with a given f value will have the characteristics given by
y-axis label. The shaded band is a 95% confidence band. For example,
there is a just over a 40% chance that a 1918 case with a f equal to -3.0
will be a personal injury case (see top-left panel).
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Figure 7(b). Relationship Between Personal Injury Cases, Appellate
Division Dissent, Lower Court Disagreement, and f in 1918. Each point
is a nonunanimous case from the 1918 term. On the y-axis is an
indicator of whether the case in question was of the type labeled (1 if it
was, 0 if not). The x-axis plots the value of f for the case. The dark line
is a loess smooth which estimates the probability that that a randomly
selected cases with a given f value will have the characteristics given by
y-axis label. The shaded band is a 95% confidence band.

The handful of written opinions in which the alignment
of the judges strongly fits the dominant alignment provides
some inkling about the underlying views that create such
patterned voting. McGraw v. Gresser110 is a 4-3 decision
110. 123 N.E. 84 (N.Y. 1919) (f = -2.934) Pound writes for the majority and is
joined by Hogan, Cardozo, and Andrews. Id. at 85. Hiscock, Collin, and
Cuddeback dissent without opinion. Id.
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finding that a wrongfully discharged civil servant had a
right to recover back wages from the official who removed
him in a tort action as well as right to reinstatement
through a mandamus action.111 The majority cites what it
describes as the “great case” of Ashby v. White112 for the
proposition that “where there is a right there is a
remedy.”113 This celebrates a controversial position in tort
law at the time, which is that tort law is open to novel
claims of wrong.114 Stubbs v. City of Rochester115 is a 4-3
decision holding that there is sufficient evidence to go to a
jury on the question of causation in a typhoid fever case
even though the plaintiff could not eliminate sources other
than the defendants’ contaminated water as cause of his
infection where statistical and other evidence made it
possible to say with “reasonable certainty” that defendant’s
contaminated water caused his infection.116 This relaxes
what had been the rule on causation because strict
application of the rule would have made recovery impossible
“in any case based upon like facts.”117 Seaver v. Ransom118 is
a 4-3 decision holding that a niece could recover as a thirdparty beneficiary of a death-bed promise made by the
husband of the dying aunt that she could forego remaking
her will to leave her house to the niece because he would
leave the niece the value of the house in his will.119 The
majority opinion concedes that a strict application of the
111. Id.
112. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 126-27, 128-38 (K.B.).
113. McGraw, 123 N.E. at 85. This maxim once meant that if there was no
remedy, then there was no legal right.
114. It is striking that Pound, the author of the opinion, thought it worthwhile
writing an opinion to express this position. The court affirms the appellate
division. Id. at 85. During that period, typically an affirmance is per curiam
without an opinion. Reversals are usually with an opinion stating reasons.
115. 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919) (f = -2.902). Hogan writes for the majority
joined by Cardozo, Pound, and Andrews. Hiscock, Chase, and McLaughlin
dissent.
116. Id. at 140.
117. Id.
118. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918) (f = -2.781) Pound writes the majority opinion
joined by Hogan, Cardozo, and Crane. Id. at 642. Hiscock, Collin, and Andrews
dissent. Id.
119. Id. at 639-40, 642.
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New York rule might deny the claim, but justifies reaching
the opposite result based on the equities of the case and the
disarray in the New York third party beneficiary cases,
observing that the outcome in these cases “must rest upon
the peculiar circumstances of each case rather than upon
the law of some other case.”120
A crude explanation for the pattern of decisions is that
the Hogan-Pound wing of the court is proplaintiff while the
McLaughlin wing is prodefendant. Looking at written
opinions from other terms in which the court sorts along
similar lines suggests a more principled point of
disagreement. In cases from the 1919 and 1920 terms, the
two wings divide on the basic question of whether it is
appropriate to hold a defendant liable for an accident for
which the defendant bears no responsibility in the sense of
fault.121 The insistence by judges on the McLaughlin wing
that liability depends on personal responsibility echoes a
view at the heart of Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co.122 This is a
controversial decision in the 1911 term unanimously
holding a New York workmen’s compensation statute
unconstitutional on the view that it is impermissible to hold

120. Id. at 641 (quoting Wright v. Glen Tel. Co., 95 N.Y.S. 101, 103 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1905)).
121. Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern Son, Inc., 128 N.E. 126, 127-29 (N.Y. 1920) (f
= -2.708) holds 5-2 that an injury arising from a fight within the workplace is
covered by workmen’s compensation. Elkus writes for the majority (joined by
Hogan, Cardozo, and Crane) that the statute should be interpreted broadly and
is a general insurance scheme. Id. at 128. McLaughlin writes in dissent (joined
by Hiscock) that the injury must be a risk associated with employment, which
the fight was not. Id. at 129 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). Chase concurs in the
judgment of the majority but not the opinion. Id. at 129. Canavan v. City of
Mechanicville, 128 N.E. 882, 882-84 (N.Y. 1920) (f = 2.909) holds 4-3 that the
liability of a municipal water supplier, for supplying water contaminated with
typhoid, must be grounded in negligence, and not strict liability, under a theory
of implied warranty. Collin writes for the majority (joined by Hiscock,
McLaughlin, and Andrews) arguing that it is unfair and bad policy to hold a
water supplier liable when it is impossible for a supplier to prevent the water
from being contaminated. Id. at 884. Pound and Elkus take the unusual step of
reading separate dissents. Id. at 887. Hogan dissents without opinion. Id.
122. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). Chase and Collin are the only Judges who
participated in the decision in Ives who also remained on the Court in the 1918
term. Hiscock was on the court in the 1911 term when Ives was decided, but did
not participate in the decision.
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an employer liable for an accident for which the employer
bore no responsibility.123
John Fabian Witt argues the decision in Ives grounds on
a nineteenth century view that tort liability is a matter of
personal responsibility and fault.124 Witt juxtaposes this
with a view we associate with a theory of enterprise
liability, which justifies liability on what Witt describes as
managerial and actuarial grounds.125 The decision in Ives
was very controversial politically and legally.126 Ives was
quickly reversed by a state constitutional amendment.127 Its
reasoning was repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court in a series of cases a few years later.128 New York
enacted a new workmen’s compensation statute.129 The
author of the decision in Ives, Judge Werner, lost in a race
for the position of chief judge in 1913 in an election that was
believed to swing on the unpopularity of the decision.130 He
resigned from the court shortly thereafter.131 By the 1918
term, no one on the court openly questions the power of the
legislature to replace the negligence system with an
insurance system. But the McLaughlin wing of the court
consistently resists efforts to expand the universe of cases
covered by the insurance system and opposes efforts to
impose liability through the common law in cases in which
they did not think the defendant responsible for the injury.
Another striking feature of the opinions that express
the collective views of the judges on the Hogan-Pound wing
is the description of the law as open and flexible. Seaver v.
Ransom is not alone in giving what later is described as a
realist account of the law. Cardozo sounds a similar theme

123. Id. at 436.
124. WITT, supra note 5, at 163-74.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 152.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 176.
130. Id. at 177-79.
131. Id.
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two terms later in Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R. Co.132 when
he writes “This case is a striking instance of the dangers of
‘a jurisprudence of conceptions’ . . . the extension of a maxim
or a definition with relentless disregard of consequences to
‘a dryly logical extreme.’”133 If we go back a few years earlier
we find opinions in nonunanimous cases that express the
collective views of judges on the opposite wing of the court
in those years that explicitly stake out a strikingly different
conception of law. These opinions argue for outcomes the
authors sometimes concede to be inequitable on the ground
that any rule that would get them to an equitable outcome
creates too much legal uncertainty or is simply not possible
using the traditional toolkit of legal concepts.134

132. 131 N.E. 898, 898-900 (N.Y. 1921) (f = -2.835) (holding that a sixteenyear-old boy killed by a falling electric wire after playing in public waters and
climbing onto a diving board on a railroad bulkhead, is allowed to recover even
though he technically was a trespasser). Hiscock, Chase, and McLaughlin
dissent. Id. at 900.
133. Id. at 900 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605, 611 (1908)).
134. Pittsburgh Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Kerr, 115 N.E. 465, 466-67 (N.Y.
1917) (f = 2.608), is a 5-2 decision in which the majority reasons that
subrogation is governed by general equitable principles similar to those that
apply to a mistaken payment of money, i.e., they liberalize subrogation by
associating it with what we think of as general principles of unjust enrichment.
Crane and Cuddeback dissent arguing that allowing recovery from an innocent
recipient of stolen funds that are paid on a note creates unacceptable
uncertainty regarding the finality of payment. Id. at 469-70 (Crane, J.,
dissenting). Zeiser v. Cohn, 101 N.E. 184, 188-89 (N.Y. 1913) (Gray, J.,
dissenting) (f = -2.585), is a 4-3 decision in which Hiscock, Collin, and Gray
object to implication of a vendor’s lien to avoid unjust enrichment on the ground
that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law and so cannot have an
equitable remedy and expressing a worry that a vendor’s lien is a new and
extraordinary equitable doctrine that ought not be carried too far. Pollitz v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 726-27 (N.Y. 1912) (Cullen, C.J., dissenting) (f
= 2.955), is a 4-3 decision in which the dissent takes the position that laches and
acquiescence are not available as defenses to a claim in which the plaintiff seeks
legal and not equitable relief because laches and acquiescence come out of
equity and not law.
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Figure 8. Relationship Between Criminal Cases and f.

Criminal cases, particularly homicide cases, stand out
in that the judges consistently align in patterns that are
unlike the dominant alignment captured by the IRT
model.135 Figure 8 shows that criminal and homicide cases in
the 1918 term in which there is a dissent cluster in the low
135. There are twenty-seven cases in which the absolute value of f is less than
.5. In nine, a judge not usually on the wing of the court dissents alone. Crane
does this four times, Chase and Cuddeback two each, and Collin once. The low f
cases other than the criminal and personal injury cases discussed in the text
and notes following are a grab bag. These include a 4-3 split decision whether
the Surrogate Court has an implied power to deny a commission to a neglectful
trustee or executor; three tax cases, two involving a disagreement over the
meaning of “net income;” a 4-3 split on the power of the Railroad Commission to
order a rebate of a rate it finds to be unreasonable; a conversion case with a 5-2
split; and six contract cases with either a 4-3 or 5-2 split.
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f range. The relatively small number of criminal and
homicide cases mute the nonparametric estimate of the
probability of a low f in these cases. Nevertheless the
estimate appears as a discernible hill cresting near a 0 f,
which is opposite the pattern found in personal injury cases.
While there are consistent voting patterns in criminal and
homicide cases, the alignment is strikingly different than
that captured by the IRT model. During the 1918 term,
Cardozo and Cuddeback generally vote with the prosecutor
in nonunanimous homicide cases while Hiscock, Hogan, and
Pound generally vote with the accused.136
There are six personal injury cases with a low absolute
f.137 The most interesting of these involves a challenge to
136. There were five nonunanimous homicide decisions in the 1918 term. In
People v. Linton, 121 N.E. 883, 883-84 (N.Y. 1918) (per curiam) (f = .115), a 4-3
court affirms a homicide conviction per curiam with Collin, Cardozo, Pound, and
Andrews in the majority and Hiscock, Hogan, and Crane dissenting on the
ground the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In People v. Esposito,
121 N.E. 344, 346 (N.Y. 1918) (f = .34), a 5-1 court votes to reverse a homicide
conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Hiscock, Chase, Collin,
Hogan, and McLaughlin are in the majority. Id. Cuddeback is the sole dissent.
Id. In People v. Minsky, 124 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1919) (f = .413), a 4-2 court
reverses a homicide conviction on the ground of a violation of an evidentiary
rule by the prosecutor. Pound, Hiscock, Collin, and Andrews are in the majority.
Id. at 128. Cuddeback and Cardozo dissent, voting to affirm the conviction on
the ground that the error was harmless. Id. at 128 (Cuddeback, Cardozo, J.J.,
dissenting). In People v. Verrino, 122 N.E. 888, 888 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f =
.471), the court affirms a homicide conviction 5-2, with Collin, Cuddeback,
Cardozo, Crane and Andrews in the majority and Hiscock and Pound dissenting.
People v. Van Zandt, 120 N.E. 725, 725 (N.Y. 1918) (per curiam) (f = -2.424), is
the only homicide decision in the term in which voting patterns aligned with the
IRT. This is a 5-2 reversal of a homicide conviction on the ground that the jury
should be instructed on the relevance of the defendant’s severe state of
intoxication on whether he could form the intent necessary for first degree
murder. Id. The defendant’s counsel had not sought such an instruction. Id.
Andrews writes a brief opinion in which Hiscock, Hogan, Cardozo, and Pound
concur. Id. Chase and McLaughlin dissent. Id. In a non-homicide criminal case,
People v. Rodgers, 123 N.E. 882, 882 (N.Y. 1919) (per curiam) (f = -.207), the
court splits 5-2 to affirm a robbery conviction, with Chase, Collin, Cuddeback,
Crane and Andrews in the majority and Hogan and McLaughlin dissenting.
137. The most atypical of these is a 5-2 decision in Di Salvio v. Menihan Co.,
121 N.E. 766 (N.Y. 1919) (f = .319). The majority reverses a workmen’s
compensation award holding that a plaintiff was not injured in the scope of
employment when he left his station to say goodbye to a fellow worker who had
been drafted; he then caught his hand in machinery. Id. Hiscock writes the
majority opinion, which holds that this stretches the concept of scope of
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the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the Industrial
Commission to award compensation for personal
disfigurement in a workplace accident without a showing of
lost earning power.138 Five judges vote to affirm the award.139
Cardozo, McLaughlin, and Andrews vote to affirm on a
broad reading of the legislative power to decide what losses
should be covered by the insurance scheme.140 The other four
judges take the position that the insurance scheme should
be construed to cover only lost earning power to avoid a
difficult constitutional question.141 Hiscock and Pound
concur in the judgment affirming the award on the ground
that loss of earning power may be presumed in a case of
disfigurement absent evidence to the contrary.142 Chase and
Hogan dissent and vote to remit the case to require a
specific finding of loss of earning power.143
D. The 1921 to 1926 Terms
The practice of appointing judges from the New York
State Supreme Court to the New York Court of Appeals to
assist the seven elected judges ended with the 1920 term.144
Thereafter the same seven judges vote on each case unless a
judge is absent from a case for a special reason or there is a
turnover in the membership of the court during a term.
employment beyond its breaking point. Id. at 766-67. The alignment is unusual
because Hogan concurs, while Chase and Crane dissent. Id. at 768. Skrodanes v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 123 N.E. 890 (N.Y. 1919), is discussed earlier. See cases
cited supra note 103. Three cases involve sole dissents. In Plass v. Central New
England Ry. Co., 123 N.E. 852, 853 (N.Y. 1919) (f = -.135) (Collin, J.,
dissenting), Collin is the sole dissent on what appears to be an issue of appellate
procedure. In Michalski v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 122 N.E. 233, 234 (N.Y.
1919) (f = -.212), Chase is the sole dissent to a decision reversing a verdict for
an injured worker on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency. In Martinkovics v.
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 121 N.E. 877, 877-78 (N.Y. 1918) (f = .338) (per
curiam), Cuddeback is the sole dissent to per curiam affirmance of a judgment
for the plaintiff in a workplace injury case.
138. See Sweeting v. Am. Knife Co., 123 N.E. 82, 83-84 (N.Y. 1919) (f = .411).
139. Id. at 84.
140. Id. at 83.
141. Id. at 84 (Pound, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id. (Chase, Hogan, J.J., dissenting).
144. BERGAN, supra note 26, at 262.
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There is little turnover from 1921 to 1925. Indeed, the seven
who serve in 1921—Hiscock, as Chief Judge, with Andrews,
Cardozo, Crane, Hogan, McLaughlin, and Pound—serve
together from the 1916 term, when Andrews, Crane, and
McLaughlin join the court, through to the 1923 term when
Lehman replaces Hogan.145 This change does not disrupt
voting patterns. The major disruption occurs in the 1926
term when Kellogg and J.F. O’Brien replace Hiscock and
McLaughlin.146
Figure 9 displays the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal
points for the 1921 to 1926 terms. Voting is highly
patterned for all terms except 1926, where the model
produces unusual results. Putting the 1926 term to the side
for the moment, the posterior ranks are very consistent and
similar to 1918.147 McLaughlin and Hiscock consistently
anchor the right-wing of the court. Andrews generally is to
the left of these two and to the right of center.148 Cardozo,
Crane, Hogan, Lehman, and Pound change positions
relative to each other but always are to the left of
McLaughlin and almost always are to the left of Hiscock149
and Andrews.150

145. Id. at 259-60, 270.
146. Id. at 270-71; NELSON, supra note 4, at 21-22.
147. These general patterns also hold for these seven judges—Hiscock,
Andrews, Cardozo, Crane, Hogan, McLaughlin, and Pound—in the 1917, 1919,
and 1920 terms. Hiscock and McLaughlin always are to the right of the other
five. Andrews always is the left of these two (as well as Collin) and to the right
of the other four. Cardozo, Crane, Hogan, and Pound change positions relative
to each other. Posterior ranks for the 1916 term are quite muddled.
148. The exceptions are 1922 and 1924.
149. The exception is 1924.
150. The exception is 1922.
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Figure 9(a). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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Figure 9(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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Figure 9(c). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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Figure 9(d). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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Figure 9(e). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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Figure 9(f). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms.
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The atypical results for 1926 do not shake our
confidence in the earlier results. Kellogg and J.F. O’Brien
replace Hiscock and McLaughlin in midterm, splitting the
cases decided during the term roughly evenly between
them. As you shall see when we turn to the 1927 to 1930
terms, the turnover in 1926 has a significant impact on
voting patterns. The switch in midterm confounds the model
by cutting in half the number of nonunanimous decisions
that can be used to predict the votes of the five judges who
voted in all cases decided in the 1926 term in relation to the
transient pairs of judges, each of which voted in roughly
half the cases. The sharp differences in voting patterns
before and after the switch further confound the model
because there may be little overlap in patterns in the two
blocks of cases.
Figure 10 displays the posterior ranks of the judges’
ideal points pooling all nonunanimous decisions during the
1921 to 1925 terms and the 1926 term before Hiscock and
McLaughlin leave the court. Pooling terms increases the
number of observations, and so, the strength of the rankings
of judges for whom the patterns hold across pooled terms.
McLaughlin, Hiscock, and Andrews now clearly appear on
the court’s right-wing and clearly in that order. Crane
stands fairly clearly on the left-wing. The pooled rankings
are very similar to the rankings for the 1921 term. The
greatest dissimilarity is between the pooled rankings and
the 1924 term. Crane moves from the far left to third from
the right. Cardozo and Lehman move to the far left. Crane
also is to the right of Cardozo and Lehman in the 1923 and
1925 terms. We will come back to this point.
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Figure 10. Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1921 to 1926 Terms Pooled.

During the 1921 to 1925 terms, as during the 1918
term, voting in personal injury cases strongly corresponds
with the dominant pattern of voting found by the model. A
disproportionately large share of the high absolute f cases
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are personal injury cases (approximately one-third).151 The
left-wing of the court always sides with the claimant in
these thirty-three cases and the right-wing of the court
always sides with the defendant.152 This pattern persists
when we look at the pooled cases from the 1921 to 1925

151. During the period there are thirty-six personal injury cases with an
absolute f of 2 or greater. There are only eight personal injury cases with an
absolute f of .5 or lower. This is from a pool of 401 nonunanimous cases, of
which 136 have an absolute f of 2.0 or greater and sixty-six have an absolute f
of .5 or lower. Summary statistics from workmen’s compensation cases are
consistent. The average absolute f in the twenty-four nonunanimous workmen’s
compensation cases is 1.98.
152. See infra notes 155-76 and accompanying text. We define high absolute f
cases as those where [f] > 2.0. The cutoff is arbitrary. Looking more closely at
cases from the 1921 to 1925 terms, we find the pattern persists below a f of 2.0.
There are twenty-five personal injury cases with an absolute f between 1.5 and
2.0. In twenty-three, the plaintiff prevails if f’s sign is negative, meaning the
left-wing prevails, and the defendant prevails if the sign positive. Voting may
follow the pattern in one of the two non-conforming cases. In Longacre v.
Yonkers R.R. Co., 140 N.E. 215, 216-18 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 1.697), the appellate
division reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and entered a verdict for the
defendant. The majority agreed with the appellate division that the verdict
could not stand because of an error in admitting evidence of the trolley
company’s own rules to establish negligence. Id. at 217-18. The majority
reversed the appellate division to order the claim be retried. Id. at 218. It is not
clear who this is a victory for. The basis for Cardozo and McLaughlin’s dissent is
not indicated. Id. In the other nonconforming case, Hayden v. New York Rys.
Co., 134 N.E. 826, 827 (N.Y. 1922) (f = 1.506), the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant in a case involving a collision between a taxi in which the plaintiff
was a passenger and another car. The plaintiff did not call the taxi driver as a
witness. Id. at 827-28. The New York Court of Appeals held it was error to
instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from this. Id. at 828.
Crane and Andrews dissent without opinion. Id.
One of the cases from the 1924 term, Moore v. Van Beuren & New York Bill
Posting Co., 148 N.E. 753, 753 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = 1.554), warrants
further mention for research by Andrew Kaufman, who provides a window to
view the court’s internal workings. See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 283-84.
Cardozo was assigned the report for the case. Id. at 283. In his report, Cardozo
advocated reversing the appellate division, and reinstating the jury verdict,
arguing that the rule that was the basis for the decision below limiting the
liability for a carelessly caused fire to the immediate victims was arbitrary and
inconsistent with the rule elsewhere. Id. While Crane and Lehman went along
with Cardozo he was not able to get a fourth vote. Id. The result is a per curiam
affirmance of the appellate division with no opinion by anyone. Moore, 148 N.E.
at 753.
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terms.153 The pooled analysis also includes cases from the
1926 term before Hiscock and McLaughlin leave the court.
While there are only four nonunanimous personal injury
cases during this period, the voting patterns strongly
correspond with the overall pattern.154
Some of the disagreement in personal injury cases can
be attributed to fundamental disagreements over whether
and the extent to which liability for accidental harm is
fault-based. This is described as the fundamental issue in a
4-2 workmen’s compensation case from the 1924 term,
153. There is significant overlap in the identity of the high absolute f cases.
The table below shows the number of high absolute f cases using the arbitrary
cutoff points of 2.0 and 1.5 for both the term and pooled analyses. We exclude
cases from the 1926 term. See infra note 154. Column one is the number of cases
with f above the indicated value in both the term and pooled analysis, Columns
two and three are the number of cases with f above the indicated value in one
but not the other, and Column four is the number of cases with the indicated f
in one or both. The differences in f between the term and pooled analyses tend
to be relatively small. For example, of the fourteen cases with an absolute f
greater than 2.0 in the term analysis alone, eleven have an absolute f greater
than 1.5 in the pooled analysis.

[f] > 2.0
[f] > 1.5

Term and
Pooled
22
46

Term alone

Pooled alone

14
13

10
8

Term or
Pooled
46
67

In all forty-six cases with an absolute f greater than 2.0 in either analysis the
verdict appears to be a victory for the claimant if the sign is negative and
appears to be a victory the defendant if the sign is positive. This also is true for
the forty-six cases with an absolute f greater than 1.5 in both analyses. This is
not surprising for these two sets of cases are almost identical. Two cases may
not fit the pattern in the term analysis. See supra note 152. One case is against
the pattern in the pooled analysis. See Sanders v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 148 N.E. 739,
739 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 1.989) (per curiam). Crane dissents to 4-1 per curiam
decision affirming a negligence verdict for the plaintiff. Id. Pound was absent.
Hiscock did not vote.
154. All four cases have high f values in the pooled analysis. Three anticipate
voting patterns later in the decade for when Cardozo and Lehman join Hiscock
and McLaughlin in decisions for the defendant. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.
Co., 155 N.E. 58, 65 (N.Y. 1926) (pooled f = 1.981); Murphy v. Stanley Court
Realty & Constr. Co., 154 N.E. 625, 625 (N.Y. 1926) (per curiam) (pooled f =
2.012); Jablonor v. Vill. of Rockville Ctr,, 154 N.E. 625, 625 (N.Y. 1926) (per
curiam) (pooled f = 2.057). Russell v. Recker, 154 N.E. 627, 627 (N.Y. 1926) (per
curiam) (pooled f = -2.709) (Hiscock and McLaughlin dissent to a 5-2 per curiam
decision for the claimant).

2012] COMMON LAW JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING

961

McCarter v. La Rock.155 An employee working on his
employer’s property was killed by fragments from an
exploding souvenir shell on a neighbor’s property.156 The
majority holds the injury not covered by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.157 Hiscock writes:
This appeal in effect presents the question whether [the Act] is to
be interpreted as furnishing a species of insurance against all
injuries received in the course of employment, or whether it is to
be interpreted as meaning that there must be a traceable, causal
connection between the employment and the risk which has
158
caused the injuries.

Cardozo and Lehman dissent.159 Several high absolute f
workmen’s compensation cases involve the question of
whether a freak injury is within the scope of employment.160
It may well be that a judge’s views on the fundamental
issue influence where he draws what is an essentially
arbitrary line. In several high absolute f negligence cases
the disagreement appears to be over the degree of fault or
responsibility necessary for liability.161 These cases raise the
155. 148 N.E. 523, 523, 526 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.751).
156. Id. at 523.
157. Id. at 526.
158. Id. at 523.
159. Id. at 526.
160. See Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 147 N.E. 366, 366 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.219) (involving employee of undertaker who died as a result of being infected
with gangrene in handling corpse); Domres v. Syracuse Safe Co., 148 N.E. 727,
727 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = -2.348) (involving employee injured while
sitting in door of workplace during lunch hour when car leapt curb and struck
him); Roberts v. J.F. Newcomb & Co., 138 N.E. 443, 444 (N.Y. 1922) (per
curiam) (f = -2.645) (holding 5-2 in a per curiam affirmance); Fried v. Quinlan,
Inc., 152 N.E. 399, 399 (1926) (per curiam) (f = 2.612) (involving employee killed
in altercation at work).
161. See, e.g., Rosebrock v. Gen. Elec. Co., 140 N.E. 571, 572 (N.Y. 1923) (per
curiam) (f = -2.45) (determining whether G.E. was liable for delivering a
transformer with protective wooden blocks that the utility company negligently
failed to remove, resulting in a disastrous explosion); Reid v. Westchester
Lighting Co., 140 N.E. 712, 712-13 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 2.362) (determining whether
a gas company may be held liable for defects in pipes it installs in a house
resulting in a fatal leak when the company no longer supplied gas to the house;
Cardozo concurs only on the narrowest ground for finding no liability, which is
that the defendant had no notice pipes were in a defective condition); Belair v.
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same fundamental issue and present a similar line-drawing
problem. Of course, the disagreement could be on other
grounds. A large handful of cases involve disputes over
contributory negligence, where the disagreement might be
on the facts, the standard of care, or the degree of deference
due the jury.162 In one high absolute f case involving the
question whether a release was fraudulently obtained, the
left-wing of the court explicitly argues that the jury’s verdict
should be respected, even though the evidence for it was
weak.163 Still, it is possible in these cases that a judge’s
views on the underlying issue influence how he resolves a
close factual or legal question.164 This is a charitable
explanation for the voting alignment in a high absolute f
case where the left-wing of the court takes the position that
an injury is outside the scope of employment while the
right-wing takes the opposite position.165 A less charitable
explanation is that voting in the case is result-driven. It was
to the advantage of the claimant that the injury be deemed
outside the scope of employment because it opened the door
to a high-value negligence claim.

State, 150 N.E. 551, 551 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = 2.639) (determining
whether by taking control of a highway the state assumes responsibility for a
pre-existing condition); Schumer v. Caplin, 150 N.E. 139, 140 (N.Y. 1925) (f =
2.774) (determining whether violation of Industrial Commission safety rules is
negligence per se).
162. See, e.g., Horton v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 142 N.E. 345, 345 (N.Y. 1923) (f =
-2.453); Chamberlin v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 144 N.E. 512, 512 (N.Y. 1924) (f
= -2.434); Shapiro v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 147 N.E. 202, 203 (N.Y. 1924) (per
curiam) (f = -2.369); Baker v. Dingwell Bros., 147 N.E. 194, 194 (N.Y. 1924) (per
curiam) (f = -2.173).
163. McNamara v. Eastman Kodak Co., 133 N.E. 113, 118-19 (N.Y. 1921)
(Crane, J., dissenting) (f = 2.403).
164. Fancher v. Boston Excelsior Co., 139 N.E. 265 (N.Y. 1923) (f = -2.71),
invites this explanation. The issue was whether a claimant who was paid by the
piece for work done by other men under his supervision was an employee or
independent contractor. Id. at 265. In this case—and Tallon v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 134 N.E. 327, 328-30 (N.Y. 1922) (McLaughlin, J., dissenting)
(f = -2.453)—the dissenters appear to have a stronger argument on the law.
165. Tallon, 134 N.E. at 328; id. at 328 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). The issue
was whether an IRT employee killed in an accident while commuting to work
with a pass was injured within the scope of employment. Id. at 327-28.
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The judges align precisely as the model depicts in
Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.166 The case
provides a window on the complex and sometimes chaotic
developments in the law of workplace injuries during this
period. The plaintiff’s husband was killed in 1918 while
employed by Robins in a maritime occupation.167 In 1917,
the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusive
remedy for workers employed in maritime occupations was
under the federal common law and that states did not have
the power to bring maritime occupations within their
workmen’s compensation systems.168 Congress quickly
enacted a law to reverse this decision to allow workers in
maritime occupations to bring workmen’s compensation
claims under state law.169 Relying on this law, the plaintiff
sought and obtained death benefits through the workmen’s
compensation system.170 The benefits were halted after the
United States Supreme Court held in 1920 that the 1917
federal legislation was an unconstitutional delegation of the
federal legislative power to the states.171 By this time the
statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff’s wrongful
death claim.172 The New York Legislature stepped in to
enact retroactive legislation relieving plaintiffs in the
widow’s position from the statutory bar so they could bring
a common law claim.173 In a 4-3 decision, the New York
Court of Appeals held this was constitutionally permissible
even though it could be said to deny the defendant of a
vested right.174 Lehman’s opinion for the majority quotes at
length from an opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., on
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that
not all vested rights are of the similar stature, that
constitutional rules could not have “the exactness of
mathematics,” and that some rules “end in a penumbra
166. 144 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924) (f = -3.047).
167. Id. at 579.
168. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917).
169. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 156.
170. Robinson, 144 N.E. at 580.
171. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 253 U.S. at 160.
172. Robinson, 144 N.E. at 580.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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where the Legislature has a certain freedom in fixing the
line,” particularly “to call a liability into being where there
was none before, if the circumstances were such as to
appeal with some strength to the prevailing views of
justice.”175 Lehman goes on, echoing Holmes, to observe “the
difficulty and the danger of giving a general judicial
definition” of the constitutional limits on the power of the
legislature to encroach on vested rights, and to argue that
whatever this limit may be, it did not prevent legislating
away a right in “extreme . . . cases where both instinct and
reason revolt at the proposition . . . contrary to all
prevailing ideas of justice.”176
Turning to commercial and contract cases with a high
absolute f, while they are relatively few in number, we find
the right-wing of the court consistently takes a position or
makes arguments that could be described as formalistic
while the left-wing of the court takes a more open and
flexible position.177 Cardozo appears to be a centrist on these
175. Id. at 581 (quoting Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1034
(1901)).
176. Id. at 581-82. Nod-Away Co. v. Carroll, 148 N.E. 512, 512-13 (N.Y. 1925)
(per curiam) (f = -2.44), is the only other high absolute f case involving a
constitutional challenge to a state statute. The majority upholds retroactive
application of a statute regulating rents, declining to reach the constitutional
question because it was raised too late. Id. Crane and McLaughlin dissent
arguing that an emergency statute regulating unreasonable rents to protect
tenants from rent increases should not apply to an agreed rent made by a new
tenant and that if it did apply it would be unconstitutional. Id. at 513 (Crane, J.,
dissenting).
177. In Cammack v. J.B. Slattery & Bros., 148 N.E. 781, 784 (N.Y. 1925) (f =
2.733), Cardozo and Lehman dissent on the issue whether an agreement under
seal may be modified by a parol agreement. Hiscock’s majority opinion concedes
“the anachronistic absurdity of giving to seals at the present day the solemnity
and force which they once justly possessed” but takes the position that the rule
must be changed by the legislature. Id. at 782. In the same term, the court
divides 4-3 in Susquehanna Steamship Co. v. A.O. Andersen & Co., 146 N.E.
381, 382-83 (N.Y. 1925) (f = -2.218), on the ability to use extrinsic evidence to
establish mutual mistake as a basis for reformation of a contract and on
whether the factual issue is for the jury. In other cases, the two wings of the
court split on whether a formal instrument could be subverted with extrinsic
evidence to establish fraud, notice of a vitiating cause, and the like. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 148 N.E. 514, 515-16 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.671); Brown v. Brown, 147 N.E. 177, 177 (N.Y. 1924) (per curiam) (f = -2.175)
(challenge to separation agreement); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Pam., 134
N.E. 525, 528 (N.Y. 1922) (f = -2.772); McNamara v. Eastman Kodak Co., 133
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issues. In a pair of much-criticized high f decisions
declining to enforce agreements with indefinite terms,
Cardozo and Pound join the conservatives McLaughlin,
Hiscock, and Andrews.178 In The Growth of the Law, Cardozo
explained his thinking in one of these cases: “[t]he court
subordinated the equity of a particular situation to the
overmastering need of certainty in the transactions of
commercial life.”179 The greater tolerance of the left-wing for
informality and flexibility cuts in interesting directions in
some noncommercial cases. For example, in a high absolute
f case from the 1922 term, the court’s left-wing holds that
the fact a magistrate took ten months and numerous
hearings to adjudicate the relator to be insane and subject
to commitment did not divest the magistrate of jurisdiction,
entitling the relator to release, even though the statute
clearly contemplated an immediate action by the magistrate
upon arraignment.180 Cardozo argues extensive delay was
N.E. 113, 114 (1921) (f = 2.403). In each of these cases, the court’s left-wing
permits or would permit the subversion. For example, Kleiman v. Clean Wash
Paint & Varnish Remover Co., 154 N.E. 609, 609 (N.Y. 1926) (per curiam) (f = 2.521), may be similar. It is a per curiam affirmance of a verdict for the plaintiff
on a fraudulent inducement claim. Id. at 609-10. A dissent in the appellate
division argues the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Kleiman v.
Clean Wash Paint & Varnish Remover, Co., 212 N.Y.S. 846, 846 (N.Y. App. Div.
1925) (Crouch, J., dissenting), aff’d, 154 N.E. 609 (N.Y. 1926). In Lord Constr.
Co. v. Edison Portland Cement Co., 138 N.E. 39, 41 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 2.563), the
split is on the ability to use estoppel to bar enforcement of a contract by its
terms based on an arguably deceptive failure to warn. In Ford v. Snook, 148
N.E. 732, 732-33 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = 2.587), the issue seems to be
whether evidence of custom and usage may be used to vary the express terms of
contract. In Brocia v. F. Romeo & Co., 148 N.E. 331, 331 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.786),
the disagreement involves procedural flexibility. The case holds that a plaintiff
cannot plead breach of one contract and then predicate a claim upon a different
contract made in modification of the first. Id. at 332-33.
178. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E.
470, 473 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 2.404). Crane and Hogan dissent. Id. Goldstein v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 140 N.E. 235, 237 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 2.446), is similar.
Both are from the 1922 term. Cardozo joins Hiscock and McLaughlin in dissent
in Aldrich v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 245, 247-49 (N.Y. 1923) (f = 2.333), where the majority found an ambiguity in a contract of an insurance
agent and then applied a presumption interpreting the ambiguity in favor of the
agent to allow a claim for renewal commissions.
179. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 110-11 (1924).
180. People ex rel. Edwards v. Superintendent, 139 N.E. 553, 554-55 (N.Y.
1923) (f = -2.333).
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permissible absent abuse by the magistrate or prejudice to
the lunatic since the possibility of some delay was implicit
in the statutory system.181
The voting patterns depicted by the model in the 1926
term are atypical. The model places Hiscock and
McLaughlin on the left-wing of the court alongside Cardozo
and Lehman. The atypical patterns appear to be a product
of a change in personnel on the court during the term—
Kellogg and J.F. O’Brien replace Hiscock and McLaughlin—
and a significant shakeup in voting patterns that occurs
around this change. Splitting the term leaves too few
nonunanimous cases (thirty-one) for the model to find much
of a pattern. When we pool these cases with cases from the
1921 to 1925 terms we find similar voting patterns in
personal injury cases until the turnover. Two high f cases
in the pooled analysis warrant mention. In these cases,
Cardozo and Lehman join the conservative wing of the court
in decisions favoring business interests through what
appears to be highly formalistic reasoning.182 These cases
are a reminder that Cardozo was, on some issues, a centrist.
181. Id. There are occasional high f cases in which the left-wing employs
formalistic reasoning. In People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 143 N.E. 653, 65455 (N.Y. 1924) (f = -3.026), the left-wing of the court held that a father could be
extradited to Ohio for the crime of non-payment of child support because his
presence in Ohio for a few hours while he was in arrears satisfied the formal
requirement for extradition that the father had been in the act of committing
the crime while in Ohio. Another such case may be In re Blumenthal’s Estate,
141 N.E. 911 (N.Y. 1923) (f = -2.504). A husband and wife sold property they
held as tenants by the entirety and took back a note secured by a mortgage. Id.
at 911. The issue in the case is whether they held the note as tenants in
common or by the entirety. Id. The court determined whether the wife’s heirs
received the entire value of the mortgage or whether they shared it with the
husband’s heirs. Id. at 911-12. The majority held the law does not recognize a
tenancy by the entirety in a chose in action. Id. at 913. McLaughlin writes a
dissent arguing that the tenancy by the entirety should be recognized by
analogy to chattels because that is the likely intent of the husband and wife. Id.
at 913-14 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
182. In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 58 (N.Y. 1926) (pooled f =
1.981), the court held 5-2, with an opinion by Cardozo, that a parent company
could not be held liable for the negligence of a subsidiary on theory it ran
connected roads as a consolidated enterprise. Crane and Pound dissent. Id. at
65. Richard Posner has criticized the decision arguing there were good reasons
to hold the parent company liable based on its conduct in the litigation and that
Cardozo’s opinion “substitut[ed] . . . words for thought.” POSNER, supra note 2, at
119-20. But cf. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 424-25. People ex rel. Studebaker

2012] COMMON LAW JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING

967

Voting patterns in the 1924 term suggest Cardozo and
Lehman were systematically to Crane’s left on some issues.
There are seventy-four nonunanimous cases in the 1924
term. Twenty-three of these have an absolute f greater than
2.0, our arbitrary cutoff defining cases in which voting
strongly corresponds with the overall pattern.183 We set to
the side nine cases in which Crane joins the left-wing of the
court and one case in which he does not vote. 184 Remaining
are thirteen cases in which Crane sides with McLaughlin
and/or Hiscock and against Cardozo and Lehman. The
issues in these cases are suggestive.185 The one personal
injury case is the previously-mentioned McCarter v. La Rock
case,186 a 4-2 decision with Cardozo and Lehman dissenting.
The case was characterized by Hiscock as raising a
fundamental question about the nature and scope of
worker’s compensation.187 In Nod-Away Co. v. Carroll,188
Crane writes a dissent in which McLaughlin joins
challenging the constitutionality of an emergency rent
Corp. of America v. Gilchrist, 155 N.E. 68, 69-70 (N.Y. 1926) (pooled f = 2.005),
involves the issue of the respect due the corporate form in a different context.
The court held 5-2 that the profits of a parent corporation could not be
consolidated with a subsidiary’s losses in determining income subject to the
franchise tax. Id. The majority holds the statute does not afford this power and
that it could not be implied. Id. at 72. Crane and Pound dissent arguing that the
commission had the power to make a reasonable allocation of income and
expense when the company’s books clearly were inaccurate and the company
provided no reasonable method. Id. at 73 (Crane, J., dissenting).
183. Another nineteen cases have an absolute f greater than 1.5.
184. In seven cases where Crane joins a coalition with Cardozo, Lehman, and
Pound, f is below -2.0 in both the term analysis and the pooled analysis,
indicating the left-wing prevails and that voting is consistent with the patterns
in both the term analysis and the pooled analysis. This includes four personal
injury cases. In two cases with f’s of -1.626 and -1.649 in the pooled analysis,
Hiscock joins Crane and what the model describes as the left-wing of the court
in the 1924 term. One of these two cases is a personal injury case.
185. People v. Mayo, 148 N.E. 732, 732 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = -2.639), is
a counterpoint to the cases discussed below. This is a 4-3 per curiam affirmance
of a bigamy conviction invoking section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which is the harmless error rule. Id. Crane joins conservatives McLaughlin and
Andrews in dissent. Id.
186. 148 N.E. 523, 526 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) ( f = 2.751).
187. Id. at 523.
188. 148 N.E. 512 (N.Y. 1925) (f = -2.44). This is a 4-2 decision with Andrews
absent. Id. at 514.
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control statute.189 In People v. Weinberger,190 Crane joins a
dissent by Andrews arguing that an obscenity conviction
should not be overturned on a technical ground.191 In Gillette
Bros. v. Aristocrat Rest., Inc.,192 Crane joins a dissent by
McLaughlin arguing for an interpretation of a lease to
protect a landlord’s interest in a fashion—which the
majority described as “[w]orking a forfeiture”193—as
unnecessary to protect the landlord’s interests.194 In In re
Kelly,195 Crane joins a dissent by McLaughlin arguing for
narrow interpretation of an arbitration clause to preserve
the jurisdiction of courts.196 In a handful of contract and
business law cases, Crane joins the right-wing in hewing to
traditional rules or formalistic application of a rule
disagreeing with Cardozo and Lehman.197 Crane’s
conservative voting behavior in these cases is consistent
with what one might expect of a Republican stalwart.198
189. Id. at 513.
190. 146 N.E. 434 (N.Y. 1925) (f = -2.381). This is a 4-2 decision with
McLaughlin absent. Id. at 436.
191. Id. at 436 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
192. 145 N.E. 748 (N.Y. 1924) (f = -2.021).
193. Id. at 750.
194. Id. at 750-51 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
195. 147 N.E. 363 (N.Y. 1925) (f = -2.048).
196. Id. at 364-65 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
197. Four cases are discussed in note 177. See Cammack v. J.B. Slattery &
Bros., 148 N.E. 781 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.733); Reynolds v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., 148 N.E. 514 (N.Y. 1925) (f = -2.671); Ford v. Snook, 148 N.E. 732, 732
(N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (f = 2.587); Brocia v. F. Romeo & Co., 148 N.E. 331
(N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.786). The disagreement in Mandell v. Moses, 147 N.E. 192,
192-93 (per curiam) (N.Y. 1924) (f = 1.712), a 5-2 case with Cardozo and
Lehman dissenting, appears to be over a factual question: whether members of
sheep breeder’s association were involved in a joint undertaking exposing them
to joint and several liability. The majority holds yes. Id. That is Kellogg’s basis
for dissenting in the appellate division. See Mandell v. Moses, 205 N.Y.S. 254,
258-59 (App. Div. 1924) (Kellogg, J., dissenting), aff’d, 147 N.E. 192 (N.Y. 1924)
(per curiam). The issue in In re Hart, 147 N.E. 174, 174 (N.Y. 1924) (f = 1.651)
(per curiam), another 5-2 case with Cardozo and Lehman dissenting, is whether
an administrator of an estate has standing to appeal an allowance of fees. The
majority holds no. Id. It is not clear what the disagreement is in Bowlby v.
McQuail, 148 N.E. 757, 759 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam), a 5-1 case with Lehman
dissenting and Cardozo not voting.
198. See NELSON, supra note 4, at 21.
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E. The 1927 to 1930 Terms
William Nelson has described the turnover in personnel
on the court during the 1926 term and the election of
Cardozo to the position of chief judge in 1926 as
transformative.199 According to Nelson, Cardozo acquired a
“working majority” with the departure of Hiscock and
McLaughlin, the election of Kellogg (a Republican who
“allied” with Cardozo), and the appointment of O’Brien (a
Roman Catholic Democrat with long service as council for
New York City).200 The other change is in 1928 when Hubbs
replaces Andrews. Nelson describes Hubbs as a “Republican
stalwart” alongside Andrews and Crane.201
Figure 11 shows the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal
points for the 1927 to 1930 terms. Voting in the 1930 term
seems fairly patterned, particularly at the wings. Voting in
the 1929 term also seems fairly patterned though somewhat
less so. Voting in the 1928 term is least patterned.
Comparing terms, there is a fair bit of stability on one wing.
Crane is always at the wing and Hubbs is always alongside
Crane once Hubbs joins the court in 1928. Pound
consistently is center-right. The relative positions of the
other judges are fuzzy and/or there is a fair bit of movement
in positions across terms. This is particularly true of
Kellogg. One constant is that Cardozo is alongside Lehman.
Looking at the four terms together, we would describe the
results from the model as muddled. Voting is much less
patterned than earlier in the decade.

199. Id. at 22.
200. Id. at 21.
201. Id.
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Figure 11(a). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1927 to 1930 Terms.
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Figure 11(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1927 to 1930 Terms.
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Figure 11(c). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1927 to 1930 Terms.
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Figure 11(d). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1927 to 1930 Terms.

A likely explanation of the muddle is that the
underlying disagreements among the judges on the court
during this period are narrower than in earlier or later
periods. There is other evidence in support of this
hypothesis. While the difference is not dramatic, the rate of
nonunanimous decisions declines from around 18% to 20%
to around 15% to 16%, which is the lowest percentage
during the entire period 1900 to 1940. The only period in
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our study with a comparably low rate is around 1910. The
position of Crane on the court’s far right from 1927 to 1930
may be telling. Until Lehman joins the court in 1923, Crane
consistently is to Cardozo’s left. Crane is center or centerright from 1923 to 1925. He moves to the far right in 1926
when Hiscock and McLaughlin depart.202
Figure 12 shows the posterior ranks when we pool cases
from the 1926 term, beginning when Kellogg and J.F.
O’Brien join the court, through the 1930 term. The most
significant change is in Kellogg’s position. Looking at voting
behavior in the 269 nonunanimous decisions decided during
this period, the model indicates Kellogg typically sides with
Cardozo and Lehman.

202. With the exception of 1932, Crane remains on the far right of posterior
distributions until 1936. Thereafter he is center-left.
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Figure 12. Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1926 to 1930 Terms Pooled.

Looking at the cases reinforces the impression that
whatever differences may define the voting patterns of the
judges, they are not the sort of fundamental disagreements
that are discernible earlier in the decade. Palsgraf v. Long
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Island R.R. Co.203 has the second highest absolute f in cases
from the 1927 term, meaning voting patterns tightly
correspond to the posterior ranks of the judges’ ideal points
that term. Cardozo’s majority opinion is joined by Kellogg,
Lehman, and Pound,204 the court’s left-wing according to the
model. Andrews’s dissent is joined by Crane and O’Brien,205
who are on the right-wing of the court. Cardozo finds for the
defendant, overriding the jury and the lower court, making
liability to a remote victim of an accident an issue of duty—
which is for the court to decide—and, as some say, taking a
cavalier approach to the facts.206 Andrews takes the position
that liability to a remote victim of an accident is not
amenable to being resolved by rules and is best resolved by
the jury case by case.207
As in earlier terms, in a number of cases that split the
court along what the model finds to be the dominant
pattern, the fundamental disagreement seems to be over
whether a rule should give way to reach a fair or just result.
During the 1927 through 1930 terms, whatever patterns
there may be in the voting cannot be attributed to
differences on this fundamental point. Sometimes the
Crane-Hubbs wing advocates for a more flexible approach.208
For example, in one case in the 1927 term, Andrews, Crane,
and O’Brien dissent to what they describe as an over-literal
interpretation of a statute that left minority shareholders
exposed to having their interests “annihilated.”209 In other
cases, it is the Kellogg-Cardozo wing that advocates for a

203. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (f = -2.803).
204. Id. at 105.
205. Id.
206. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 38-43.
207. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105.
208. Valz v. Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp., 163 N.E. 124, 125 (N.Y. 1928) (f
= 2.088), is a challenge to a default judgment foreclosing an equity of
redemption. The issue is whether to overlook a formal defect in service of
process by publication. Id. The plaintiff published in two papers but one was not
the paper provided by the court. Id. The defendants challenging the default
judgment had actual notice and chose not to appear because they thought the
interest valueless at the time. Id. at 125-26.
209. In re Dresser, 161 N.E. 179, 180 (N.Y. 1928) (per curiam) (f = -2.881)
(O’Brien, J., dissenting).
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more flexible approach. In Dodd v. Martin,210 Pound writes
for Crane, Andrews, and O’Brien to hold that a trial judge
has no power to withdraw a guilty plea entered as a result
of misunderstanding of the law by all involved, explaining
that “[t]he Legislature has provided a mechanistic rule to
take the place of the discretionary powers of the judge in
passing sentence on second offenders. The Executive may
relieve from the hardship of a particular case. We cannot.”211
Cardozo, Kellogg, and Lehman dissent.212 In another high
absolute f 4-3 decision from the 1928 term, the KelloggCardozo wing of the court adopts what a contemporaneous
observer described as a “strained theory of admissions”213 to
prevent an insured from recovering for risks outside the
policy.214 The evidence showed the plaintiff’s deceased son
was uninsurable, which precluded recovery on a life
insurance policy.215 In a 4-3 decision from the 1929 term, the
Crane-Hubbs wing holds a mortgagee was acting in his
rights in declaring default and demanding payment in full
when the mortgagor mistakenly failed to pay full interest.216
O’Brien wrote for the majority, “[p]laintiffs may be
ungenerous, but generosity is a voluntary attribute and
cannot be enforced even by a chancellor.”217 Cardozo’s
dissent is an eloquent argument on behalf of the power of
equity to relieve the mortgagor from its mistake and avoid
the harsh effects of default.218
Palsgraf is representative of a pattern in high absolute
f personal injury cases for the 1927 to 1930 terms.219 In
210. 162 N.E. 293 (N.Y. 1928) (f = 2.616).
211. Id. at 295.
212. Id.
213. Recent Case, Admissions—By Parties and Privies—Beneficiary’s Proofs of
Loss as Admission of Contents, 43 HARV. L. REV. 132, 133 (1929).
214. See Rudolph v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 223, 224-25
(N.Y. 1929) (f = -2.354).
215. Id. at 224.
216. See Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 884-85 (N.Y. 1930) (f = 2.38).
217. Id. at 885.
218. Id. at 886-89 (Cardozo, C.J., dissenting).
219. The 1927 term is unusual in that there are six personal injury cases with
a f less than .5 and only two, including Palsgraf, with a f greater than 2.
During the 1930 term there are six personal injury cases with f > 2 and one
with f < .5; during the 1929 term there are eight personal injury cases with f >
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twenty of twenty-one personal injury cases with an absolute
f greater than 2, the Cardozo-Lehman wing sides with the
defendant and against recovery.220 The diversity of issues in
2 and two with f < .5; and during the 1928 term there are five personal injury
cases with f > 2 and two with f < .5.
220. There are several cases with f > 2. See, e.g., Hendricks v. New York, N.H.
& H. R. Co., 167 N.E. 449, 449-50 (N.Y. 1929) (f = 2.918) (reversing appellate
division and reinstating judgment for plaintiff in F.E.L.A. claim); McDonald v.
People’s Gas & Elec. Co. of Oswego, 164 N.E. 592, 592 (N.Y. 1928) (per curiam)
(f = 2.931) (affirming per curiam judgment for plaintiff, rejecting argument that
driver was operating vehicle for own purposes); Bezue v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co.,
176 N.E. 828, 828-29 (N.Y. 1931) (f = 2.638) (affirming per curiam F.E.L.A.
award and finding employee engaged in interstate commerce); Kenney v. Lord &
Taylor, Inc., 173 N.E. 853, 853 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (f = 2.281) (affirming
workmen’s compensation award for employee injured while dancing at dinner
held by employer in its building); Reville v. Kurte, 168 N.E. 416, 416 (N.Y. 1929)
(per curiam) (f = 2.219) (affirming per curiam judgment for plaintiff in personal
injury claim for improper lighting of tenement); Vecchio v. Combined Constr.
Co., 177 N.E. 145, 145 (1931) (per curiam) (f = 2.21) (affirming per curiam
upward adjustment of workmen’s compensation award based on new evidence);
Westfelt v. Atlas Furniture Co., 177 N.E. 147, 147 (N.Y. 1931) (per curiam) (f =
2.157) (affirming per curiam workmen’s compensation award with Kellogg’s sole
dissent); Westerman v. Equip. & Supply Co., 170 N.E. 125, 125 (N.Y. 1929) (per
curiam) (f = 2.044) (affirming per curiam workmen’s compensation award where
employer argued employee was struck by train because he was intoxicated).
Additionally, there are several cases with f < -2. See, e.g., Hyland v. Cobb, 169
N.E. 401, 401-02 (N.Y. 1929) (f = -3.048) (reversing judgment for plaintiff in dog
bite case where the issue was whether Gramercy Park was a public place, which
would make a dog being off its leash a violation of ordinance, and could
therefore be admitted as evidence negligence); Hart v. N. Union Gas Co., 170
N.E. 143, 143-44 (N.Y. 1929) (per curiam) (f = -2.946) (affirming an appellate
division decision to reverse judgment for the plaintiff in personal injury claim—
a pregnant woman had stepped on a utility pipe that moved, causing her to
fall—on the ground of contributory negligence as a matter of law in stepping on
pipe); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (f = -2.803);
Schrader v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. Co., 172 N.E. 272, 273-74 (1930) (per
curiam) (f = -2.648) (finding contributory negligence as a matter of law where a
motorist took no precautions in crossing railroad tracks); Toole v. New York
Cent. R.R. Co., 173 N.E. 898, 898 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (f = -2.566) (finding
contributory negligence as a matter of law in a railroad crossing automobile
accident); Fredette v. Vill. of Whitehall, 164 N.E. 593, 593 (N.Y. 1928) (per
curiam) (f = -2.334) (affirming per curiam summary judgment for municipality
in a slip and fall case); Mack v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 177 N.E. 186, 186 (1931)
(per curiam) (f = -2.174) (affirming per curiam directed verdict for railroad on
ground that conductor was acting outside of scope of employment when he
assaulted passenger; Cardozo joins in the dissent); Trebitsch v. Goelet Leasing
Co., 170 N.E. 140, 140 (N.Y. 1929) (per curiam) (f = -2.102) (affirming per
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curiam judgment notwithstanding verdict for building owner on ground that
elevator operator who assaulted plaintiff was not acting within scope of
employment; Crane is the sole dissenter); Smith v. Northport Waterworks Co.,
170 N.E. 128, 128 (N.Y. 1929) (per curiam) (f = -2.089) (affirming per curiam
judgment employee was not injured in scope of employment; Crane is the sole
dissenter).
The pattern holds in cases involving collateral issues affecting recovery. See,
e.g., Finkelstein v. New York Merch. Co., 170 N.E. 127, 127 (N.Y. 1929) (per
curiam) (f = -2.622) (holding costs of care not covered by workmen’s
compensation); Beekman v. W.A. Brodie, Inc., 163 N.E. 298, 298 (N.Y. 1928)
(per curiam) (f = -2.152) (holding workmen’s compensation carrier cannot be
bound by estoppel or waiver as result of the conduct of the employer); Price v.
Nat’l Sur. Co., 159 N.E. 662, 662 (N.Y. 1927) (per curiam) (f = 2.279) (holding
loss of services of an infant child and medical expenses for her cure are within
provision of highway law requiring bond to cover injury “to persons or
property”).
One case does not fit the pattern. See Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng’g Co., 175 N.E.
123, 126-28 (N.Y. 1931) (f = -2.244) (Crane was the sole dissent to decision
verdict for plaintiff where the disagreement appears to be whether an error in
the jury instruction required retrial).
The pattern continues in cases with an absolute f > 1.5. See, e.g., Chaloux v.
Royal Knitting Co., 177 N.E. 143, 143 (N.Y. 1931) (per curiam) (f = -1.963)
(holding that shooting by lunatic while at work was not within the scope of
employment); Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y.
1931) (f = -1.91) (finding no negligence as a matter of law in a slip-and-fall
case); Burke v. Bonat, 174 N.E. 635, 635-36 (N.Y. 1931) (f = -1.91) (reversing
verdict for plaintiff injured during product demonstration on the ground that
jury should have been required to find the salesman was acting within scope of
his employment); Jacob v. City of New York, 177 N.E. 181, 181 (N.Y. 1931) (per
curiam) (f = -1.887) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
after a poorly stabilized fence fell on a pedestrian); Lee v. New York, Ontario &
W. Ry. Co., 171 N.E. 790, 790 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (f = 1.835) (reversing
lower courts on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence in
maintaining a railroad crossing); French v. New York Rys. Corp., 175 N.E. 312,
312 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (f = -1.604) (affirming appellate division decision to
reverse verdict for plaintiff on the ground of contributory negligence as a matter
of law; Cardozo joins in the dissent); Bond v. Schenectady Ry. Co., 167 N.E. 455,
456 (N.Y. 1929) (f = 1.807) (reversing judgment for defendant notwithstanding
verdict, holding contributory negligence was a question for the jury on these
facts; Lehman was the sole dissenter); Morini v. Erie R.R. Co., 171 N.E. 773, 773
(N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (f = 1.613) (affirming per curiam workmen’s
compensation award). There is one case that does fit the pattern. See Andrews
v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 170 N.E. 506, 507-08 (1930) (f = 1.674) (holding
that an on-the-job injury that was a result of an epileptic seizure was not within
the scope of employment; Crane wrote the majority opinion and O’Brien and
Cardozo dissented).
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the cases makes it difficult to discern a substantive theme
other than that judges on the Cardozo-Lehman wing are
more disposed to resolve issues of negligence and
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The pattern
holds in the pooled analysis, including cases decided in the
1926 term after Kellogg and J.F. O’Brien join the court.221
There is another pattern in a large handful of high
absolute f criminal cases where the issue is the
harmlessness of a technical or procedural error or
evidentiary sufficiency. In every such case, save one, the
Cardozo-Lehman wing sides with the criminal defendant.222
This is a reversal from Cardozo’s voting pattern in his early
years on the court, when he almost always sides with the
state in nonunanimous criminal cases. The pattern is even
stronger in the pooled analysis, which picks up cases from
the 1926 term after Kellogg and J.F. O’Brien join the court
and additional cases from the 1928 term where Kellogg
joins Lehman in siding with a criminal defendant. In the
pooled analysis there are twenty criminal cases with an
absolute f greater than 1.5. The Lehman-Kellogg-Cardozo
wing of the court sides with a criminal defendant in
221. For these purposes, we count as personal injury cases only those cases
denoted by the case report as involving negligence or worker’s compensation
issues. Sixty-five such cases are in the pool. This excludes some cases discussed
in note 220, where we include cases involving personal injury claims for which
no issue is identified. Of these, fourteen cases have an absolute f greater than
2.0. In thirteen of the fourteen, f’s sign correlates with whether there is a
victory for the claimant with the court’s right-wing siding with the claimant.
Eighteen cases have an absolute f greater than 1.5 and less than 2.0. In
seventeen of the eighteen, voting follows the pattern.
222. See, e.g., People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 466, 468-71 (N.Y. 1930) (f = 2.992) (reversing and ordering a new trial in homicide conviction based on
improper introduction of character evidence with the dissent argueing the error
was harmless); People v. Wagner, 162 N.E. 521, 521 (N.Y. 1928) (per curiam) (f
= 2.582) (dissenting to holding that error in a self-defense instruction was
harmless); People v. Spickler, 175 N.E. 111, 112 (N.Y. 1931) (per curiam) (f = 2.540) (reversing homicide conviction on ground that doubt regarding witness
identification requires a new trial); People v. Jackerson, 159 N.E. 715, 716-17
(N.Y. 1928) (f = 2.517) (dissenting to affirmance of conviction where the issue
appeared to be the lower court’s failure include an element of the charge);
People v. Sugarman, 162 N.E. 24, 25 (N.Y. 1928) (f = 2.168) (dissenting alone,
Cardozo votes to affirm a conviction, citing the defect as a technical evidentiary
error). People v. Galtraf, 166 N.E. 342, 342 (N.Y. 1929) (per curiam) (f = 2.98), is
the lone exception. A 6-2 majority affirmed the appellate division per curiam in
dismissing an indictment. Id.
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nineteen of the cases.223 People v. Doran224 is evocative of
some of the underlying disagreements that may produce
such patterned voting. The issue in the case was whether a
confession of a defendant convicted of a homicide in the
course of an armed robbery was coerced.225 While there was
some evidence of coercion (it was undisputed that the
confession was given while the defendant was being held
incommunicado and that he was interrogated by a police
officer wearing a boxing glove), Crane wrote for the majority
that there was sufficient evidence the confession was not
coerced to sustain putting the issue to the jury and an
implicit finding that it had not been coerced.226 Crane’s
opinion can be read to suggest that if there was an error, it
was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence of
223. There are diverse issues. The issue in some cases appears to be whether a
procedural error was harmless or whether evidence was sufficient. See, e.g.,
People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 339-41 (N.Y. 1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting)
(pooled f = 2.484) (affirming homicide conviction, with a strong dissent by
Lehman arguing that trials of co-defendants should have been severed); People
v. Pesky, 173 N.E. 227, 227 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (pooled f = 2.446)
(affirming obscenity conviction); People v. Malkin, 164 N.E. 900, 903-04 (N.Y.
1928) (pooled f = -1.851) (ordering new trial for several defendants convicted of
assault in context of union action on ground that admitting evidence of violent
activity of union in other contexts was prejudicial error). In other cases the issue
is whether the defendant’s conduct was within the scope of the crime. See, e.g.,
People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 404-05 (N.Y. 1931) (Kellogg, J., dissenting)
(pooled f = 1.592) (holding that hijacking an occupied car is kidnapping; Kellogg
is the sole dissent). Several cases involve economic crimes. See, e.g., People v.
Hudson View Gardens, Inc., 171 N.E. 790, 790 (N.Y. 1930) (per curiam) (pooled
f = -2.992) (reversing a conviction for running an illegal laundry on the ground
that defendant’s laundry was not open to the public); People v. Noblett, 155 N.E.
670, 673-74 (N.Y. 1927) (pooled f = -2.17) (dismissing an indictment for larceny
on the ground that the defendant’s conduct—receiving money under false
pretenses—was not within the crime); People v. Nakamori, 177 N.E. 166, 166
(N.Y. 1931) (per curiam) (pooled f = -1.65) (reversing a conviction for illegal
gambling); People v. Thompson, 167 N.E. 575, 575-76 (N.Y. 1929) (pooled f = 1.563), (reversing a conviction for illegal practice of medicine); People v. Farson,
155 N.E. 724, 727 (N.Y. 1927) (pooled f = 2.275) (holding an indictment for
securities price manipulation to be sufficiently clear); People ex rel. Atkins v.
Jennings, 161 N.E. 326, 329 (N.Y. 1928) (Crane, J., dissenting) (pooled f =
2.025) (granting habeus corpus based on what Crane argues in dissent was
technical evidentiary flaw in the record).
224. 159 N.E. 379 (N.Y. 1927) (pooled f = 2.025).
225. Id. at 381.
226. Id. at 389.
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guilt,227 which perhaps prompted Andrews to write in a
concurring opinion that clarity of guilt could not cloak
coercion of a confession else we “revert to the rack and
thumbscrew.”228 Everyone in the majority, including Crane,
concurred with Andrews on this point.229 Lehman wrote a
dissent, joined by Cardozo, arguing that the claim that the
confession was not coerced defied “reason and common
sense” and while “courts should not hamper the police by
technical rules nor reverse a just conviction because of
technical error, but the courts cannot sanction disregard of
the substantial rights of an accused.”230
Several memorable cases with strong dissenting
opinions come from this period, including Allegheny College
v. Nat’l. Chautauqua Cnty. Bank,231 Meinhard v. Salmon,232
and Mitchill v. Lath.233 For our purposes, what is
noteworthy about these cases is that voting in them does
not fit the dominant pattern. In other periods, this might
tend to suggest that the views and values that divide the
judges in these cases are unlike the views and values that
divide the judges in most cases in which they disagree. We
hesitate to draw even this weak conclusion during this
period for we cannot discern recurring disagreements in the
cases in which the judges divide along what the model finds
to be the dominant pattern. This is unlike every other
period we examined closely. The most comparable period to
227. Id. at 382-84.
228. Id. at 386 (Andrews, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 389.
230. Id. at 388-89 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
231. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927) (f = .494). The case holds charitable
subscriptions are legally binding. Cardozo’s opinion cuts the legs out from under
the bargain theory of consideration while saying kind things about promissory
estoppel. Id. at 175. Andrews and Kellogg dissent. Id. at 178.
232. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (f = -.389). The majority holds a silent partner
was entitled to half the profits from a venture entered into by the active partner
taking over a lease that had been held by the partnership. Id. at 545-46, 548-49.
The active partner did not disclose the opportunity. Id. at 546. Cardozo’s opinion
became the canonical expression of the view of the general duty of loyalty owed
by a fiduciary. Id. at 546. Andrews, Kellogg, and O’Brien dissent. Id. at 553.
233. 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928) (f = -.797). The majority embraces a strong form
of the parol evidence rule, placing certainty and predictability in business
transactions before fairness in the result. Id. at 646-47. Lehman and Crane
dissent. Id. at 650.
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the 1927–1930 terms in this respect is the 1910–1911 terms,
where the recurring disagreement we discern is subtle.
Two possibly related findings in this period stand out.
One is Crane’s shift in position on the court. He starts the
decade on the model’s far left-wing, moves to the center in
1923 to 1925, and then to the far right in the 1926 through
1930 terms. The other is the pattern of voting in personal
injury cases. In high absolute f personal injury cases, the
sign of f is a good indicator of the victor. This holds true
throughout the decade except for 1926 (though the pattern
weakens a bit in 1925). What changes is that in the 1927
through 1930 terms a positive sign (meaning the right-wing
prevails) signals a victory for the plaintiff. In this respect,
Crane’s behavior in personal injury cases remains constant
over the 1920s. He always is on the wing siding with the
plaintiff in cases with patterned voting throughout the
decade. From this perspective, it is the behavior of Cardozo
and Lehman that changes. The change occurs around the
time of the departure of Hiscock and McLaughlin from the
court.
This is not evidence that the views of Crane, Cardozo, or
Lehman influencing their decisions in personal injury cases
changed during the decade. Nor is it evidence that Cardozo
and Lehman shifted from a proplaintiff position to a
prodefendant position in personal injury cases. Voting
patterns in nonunanimous cases are not evidence of bias, for
at any point in time, most personal injury cases decided by
the court are decided unanimously with a mix of results.
The voting patterns in nonunanimous personal injury cases
only show that in cases in which the result is up for grabs,
for whatever reason, certain judges tended to vote together
for a result favoring the plaintiff while other judges tended
to vote together for a result favoring the defendant. In the
period from 1917 to 1925, we think we can discern an
underlying disagreement on the importance of fault to
liability that partly explains the pattern. Views on such
related issues, as the degree of deference to be given to the
jury, may also play a part.234 As for the change in voting
patterns in personal injury cases after 1926, if we assume
that the views and values which influence voting in
234. Contemporary observers understood these two things were connected by a
prevailing jury sentiment favoring compensation. See NELSON, supra note 4, at
95-96.
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personal injury cases are largely stable, then a likely
inference is that Crane’s views and values are closer to
those of Cardozo and Lehman than to those of Hiscock and
McLaughlin. The interest in forming a coalition brings
Crane, Cardozo, and Lehman together, tending to elide the
differences that divide them. The departures of Hiscock and
McLaughlin bring these differences out into the open.235
Our findings support some hypotheses that have been
offered to explain Cardozo’s behavior in Palsgraf. They
support the claim that Cardozo was insensitive to the plight
of Mrs. Palsgraf.236 More precisely, Cardozo’s pattern of
voting in personal injury cases suggests he was more
inclined than judges on the other wing of the court to vote
for an outcome that left a victim of an accident without
compensation. Given Cardozo’s voting behavior earlier in
the decade, it may be more accurate to say that he was less
inclined than judges on the other wing to allow his
sympathies for the plaintiff to divert him from a result he
thought desirable for other reasons. This is consistent with
the alignment of Cardozo and Crane in commercial and
contract cases.
As for what these other reasons might have been,
Andrew Kaufman argues “Palsgraf was simply Cardozo’s
attempt to clarify basic negligence doctrines.”237 William
Nelson argues that Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf was an
attempt to “work out the tension between the competing
paradigms of liability,”238 referring on the one hand to an old
paradigm that left losses where they lie unless a
defendant’s negligence was an immediate and direct cause
of a harm and, on the other hand, a new paradigm in which
235. The rules for assigning opinions tend to encourage such behavior. Each
case was assigned to one judge to write a memorandum laying out the issues
and recommending a disposition. This was done at random. If that judge voted
in the majority, then the opinion was assigned to him unless he chose to defer. If
he was in the dissent, then the opinion was assigned to the first judge around
the conference table to vote for the majority position. The judges sat around the
table in the order of seniority. The judge who wrote the memo voted first and
then they went around the table. See Mario M. Cuomo, The New York Court of
Appeals: A Practical Perspective, 34 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 197, 216-17 (1960).
236. JOHN T. NOONAN JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 142-43 (1976).
237. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 301.
238. NELSON, supra note 4, at 97.
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an actor whose large-scale enterprise created the conditions
in which an accident occurred could be held liable without
much in the way of fault. Our findings arguably support
both hypotheses. They support Nelson if voting in personal
injury cases generally is uni-dimensional along lines that
are captured by the competing paradigms. Voting patterns
in the early part of the decade might reflect the conflict
between the old paradigm (which best captures the views of
the court’s right-wing) and the new paradigm (which best
captures the views of the court’s left-wing). Cardozo’s voting
pattern across the entire decade is what we would expect of
someone trying to work out the tension between the two
paradigms. Our findings support Kaufman’s239 insofar as
they show that Cardozo and Crane were not that far apart
on whatever underlying values drive voting in personal
injury cases. This gives more subtle motivations along the
lines of those suggested by Kaufman space to operate.
Crane’s voting behavior suggests other factors may have
been at work in producing patterned voting. It is striking
that Crane voted with the court’s right-wing in McCarter v.
La Rock,240 a case that was framed as presenting the conflict
between the two paradigms. Looking at Crane’s voting
behavior over the entire decade, and indeed through the
1930s, one gets the impression that when a legal or factual
issue was in doubt he was inclined to vote for recovery in
personal injury cases.
F. The 1938 to 1940 Terms
Voting is much more highly structured during the 1938
to 1940 terms than it is in the early 1930s. Figure 13
depicts the posterior ranks of the judges each term. The
results for the 1940 term are remarkably clear. The results
for the other two terms are reasonably clear, particularly
once one discounts for the high turnover on the court during
the 1939 term, which tends to obfuscate patterns. Crane,
Hubbs, and J.F. O’Brien left the court during the 1939 term
and were replaced by Conway, Lewis, and Sears.241 The
239. KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 301.
240. 148 N.E. 523, 526 (N.Y. 1925) (f = 2.751).
241. Lehman’s brother, who was governor, appointed Sears to fill Lehman’s
position as Associate Justice when Lehman was elected to the position of Chief
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voting patterns are stable across terms. Rippey, Hubbs, and
Conway stand distinctly on one wing. Lehman stands
distinctly on the other wing with Sears joining Lehman on
the wing for his short time on the court.

Justice. Desmond replaced Sears in the 1940 term when Sears reached the
mandatory retirement age.
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Figure 13(b). Posterior Ranks of Ideal Points, 1938 to 1940 Terms.
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The high absolute f cases during the period suggest
ideological differences contribute to the patterned voting.
During the 1940 term, the court divided along the lines
depicted by the model in a 4-3 decision rejecting an equal
protection challenge to a health regulation which denied
licenses
to
independent
milk
distributers
while
grandfathering existing distributors.242 Several cases from
the 1939 term involve challenges to legislative or
administrative action as unconstitutional or as arbitrarily
exercised. The left-wing always sides with the government
and the right with the challenger.243 These voting patterns
correspond with patterns in several prominent decisions on
the constitutionality of wage and price regulations earlier in
the 1930s.244
242. Stracquadanio v. Dep’t of Health of New York, 32 N.E.2d 806, 809-10
(N.Y. 1941) (f = -2.8).
243. See, e.g., Franklin Soc’y. for Home Bldg. & Sav. v. Bennett, 24 N.E.2d
854, 856 (N.Y. 1939) (f = -2.516) (rejecting constitutional and statutory
challenge to a tax on recording mortgages); McCarthy v. LaGuardia, 28 N.E.2d
715, 716 (N.Y. 1940) (per curiam) (f = -2.238) (rejecting a petition that
compensation paid to clerks of justices of municipal court as “so unreasonably
low and inadequate that it constituted an arbitrary and illegal exercise” of
statutory power); Finn v. City of New York, 25 N.E.2d 966, 967-68 (N.Y. 1940) (f
= -2.104) (rejecting public official’s challenge to ordinance providing that his
acceptance of reduced salary was a release of claim that reduction was
unconstitutional); Cowen v. Reavey, 28 N.E.2d 390, 393-94 (N.Y. 1940) (f =
2.138) (invalidating conditions set for participation in civil service exam as
excluding members of bar who did not graduate from a qualified law school and
over-weighing subjective factors; the dissent argues agency decision is
discretionary and unreviewable).
244. In People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 200 N.E. 799, 800-01 (N.Y. 1936) (f
= 1.991), in a 4-3 decision, the court held a minimum wage law violated the due
process clause on the authority of Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the Dist. of
Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Crane wrote the majority opinion and was joined
by O’Brien, Hubbs, and Finch. Tipaldo, 200 N.E. at 811. Lehman wrote a
dissenting opinion and was joined by Crouch and Loughran. Id. In Darweger v.
Staats, 196 N.E. 61, 66-67 (N.Y. 1935) (f = 1.994), in a 4-3 decision, the court
held the delegation of unlawful legislative power to the state counterpart to the
National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional. Again, Crane wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by O’Brien, Hubbs, and Loughren. Id. at 72.
Again, Lehman wrote the dissent and was joined by Crouch and Finch. Id.
Voting patterns are different in W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 2 N.E.2d
22, 27 (N.Y. 1936) (f = .285), which upheld New York’s Unemployment
Insurance Law (1935) in a 5-2 decision. Crane wrote the majority opinion. Id. at
32. Hubbs and O’Brien dissented. Id.
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The court splits along the lines indicated by the model
in a number of labor cases from the 1938 and 1940 terms. In
the 1938 term, the court split 4-3 in two cases rejecting
multibarreled challenges to the 1937 Labor Relations Act.245
There was a similar split in a 4-3 decision dismissing an
injunction to restrain a labor union from picketing a familyowned business to protest unionized employees being
replaced by family members. 246 Turning to the 1940 term, a
4-3 decision reversed a conviction for disorderly conduct of
peaceful union picketers engaged in secondary picketing on
constitutional and statutory grounds.247 However, labor did
not always win. In a 4-2 decision, the court embraces the
doctrine of prima facie tort to supply a basis for an
injunction to prevent the Musician and Stagehands’ Unions
from protesting the use of machinery to replace live
musicians.248 The majority held this was not a lawful
objective.249 A similar majority held that the anti-injunction
statute did not cover picketing for an unlawful objective.250 A
4-3 decision chastises the labor board for allowing workers
to invalidate an existing union agreement with an employer
by selecting another union as their bargaining

245. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 20 N.E.2d
390, 392 (N.Y. 1939) (f = -2.636). Loughran writes for the majority, rejecting all
the challenges including an argument that white collar workers were not
employees covered by the Act. Id. at 394-95. The dissent was on the last point,
“without considering other grounds involved.” Id. at 396 (O’Brien, Hubbs,
Rippey, J.J., dissenting). Bank of Yorktown v. Boland, 21 N.E.2d 191, 191 (N.Y.
1939) (per curiam) (f = -2.644), was the same lineup in a per curiam remand of
similar claims declining to address certified questions.
246. Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry Mkt. v. Heller, 21 N.E.2d 687, 687-88
(N.Y. 1939) (f = -2.393). The court also split as indicated by the model in People
v. Schenk, 17 N.E.2d 457, 457-58 (N.Y. 1938) (per curiam) (f = 2.264) (per
curiam affirmance of conviction for criminal coercion by labor union).
247. People v. Muller, 36 N.E.2d 206, 206-07 (N.Y. 1941) (f = -2.8).
248. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 34 N.E.2d 349, 353-54 (N.Y. 1941) (f =
2.41).
249. Id.
250. Am. Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 36 N.E.2d 123, 125-26 (N.Y.
1941) (f = 2.03).
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representative.251 Finch wrote: “the decision found by the
Labor Board puts a premium upon industrial unrest.”252
During all three terms, many of the high absolute f
cases are personal injury cases, including both negligence
cases and workmen’s compensation cases. The court’s rightwing consistently sides with the plaintiff in these cases
while the left-wing consistently sides with the defendant.
There are thirty-three personal injury cases with an
absolute f greater than 2.0 during the three terms. The
Rippey (or right-wing of the court sides with the plaintiff in
thirty-two of the thirty-three personal injury cases.253 Twothirds of these cases (twenty-one) are per curiam decisions
without opinion. In most of the cases without an opinion,
the disagreement seems to be on the application of settled
rules of law to the facts, usually whether there was
sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury.254 In many
251. Triboro Coach Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 36 N.E.2d
315, 315-16 (N.Y. 1941) (f = 2.39).
252. Id. at 316.
253. The exception involves an issue unrelated to personal injury law—the
right of a widow suing as her husband’s executrix to be excused from the cost of
litigating an appeal under a statute excusing a “poor person.” Fontheim v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co., 24 N.E.2d 95, 95 (N.Y. 1940) (f = 2.179). Lehman dissents. Id. at
96. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19 N.E.2d 981 (N.Y. 1939) (f = 1.703), is a
fairly high f case in which the left-wing sides with plaintiff. The court held 5-2
that a business was not liable to a ten-year-old boy injured by a fire started by
other boys with waste gasoline taken from the business after hours even though
the defendant was aware of the theft and misuse of its waste gasoline and did
nothing to prevent it. Id. at 982. The majority treated the issue as one of
attractive nuisance. Id. at 983-84. Lehman, in an opinion joined by Loughran,
dissented, arguing correctly that the issue was not attractive nuisance but
whether the theft and misuse of the gas was a superseding cause, which was a
question for the jury on these facts. Id. at 986-87 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
254. Five are premises liability cases in which the court splits 4-3 or 5-2. See
Simmons v. Radio Printing Corp., 18 N.E.2d 866, 866 (N.Y. 1939) (per curiam)
(f = 2.614); Schumm v. 25th Props., Inc., 28 N.E.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. 1940) (per
curiam) (f = 2.611); Rosenberg v. City of New York, 21 N.E.2d 877, 877 (N.Y.
1939) (per curiam) (f = 2.588); Sauter v. City of New York, 20 N.E.2d 1010, 1010
(N.Y. 1939) (f = 2.577); McCaffrey v. City of New York, 20 N.E.2d 1009, 1009
(N.Y. 1939) (per curiam) (f = 2.536). Vroman v. State, 24 N.E.2d 975, 975 (N.Y.
1939) (per curiam) (f = -2.51), involves a claim against the state that it was
negligent to have a bridge girder that obtruded in a public highway. In
Proefrock v. Denney, 28 N.E.2d 44¸44-45 (N.Y. 1940) (per curiam) (f = -2.226),
the issue seems to be whether there was sufficient evidence an operator of a
train was negligent in failing to stop when the plaintiff’s automobile crossed the
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of these cases the defendant’s negligence was in failing to
eliminate dangerous condition on its business premises or
public area it controlled.
O’Hanlon v. Murray255 may provide a window on some of
the underlying disagreements that produce the patterns we
find. This is a wrongful death claim brought on behalf of a
man run over by a subway train.256 A passenger spotted the
man unconscious on the tracks.257 The passenger notified
subway attendants, who rescued the man from the tracks
but left him unconscious near the edge of the platform.258
The man revived and stepped in front of an oncoming
train.259 The jury returned a verdict for the victim after
being presented with two theories of negligence: 1) that the
station agents were negligent in leaving the man where
they did, and 2) that the motorman was negligent in not
stopping the train to avoid hitting the victim.260 The
appellate division reversed.261 The court then reversed the
appellate division 4-3.262 Rippey and Conway—who the
model places at the far right—voted to reinstate the jury
verdict, arguing that while the evidence suggested the
motorman could have avoided the accident had he used
reasonable care was slim, it was sufficient to support a jury
tracks. In Cammarata v. Nassau Appliance Co., 27 N.E.2d 205, 205 (N.Y. 1940)
(per curiam) (f = 2.097), the issue seemed to be entirely factual, whether one
could infer a truck was being driven in the scope of employment. The factual
circumstances are not indicated in Bordes v. Murray, 31 N.E.2d 513, 513 (N.Y.
1940) (per curiam) (f = 2.78). The case history only states the issues were
whether there was sufficient evidence to put the issues of negligence and the
absence of contributory negligence to the jury. Id. Lehman is the sole dissenter
in two slip and fall cases that are described as turning on a factual issue. See
Joseph v. Horn & Hardart Co., 32 N.E.2d 831, 832 (N.Y. 1941) (per curiam) (f =
2.46); Walz v. Paul Helfer Inc., 36 N.E.2d 640, 640-41 (N.Y. 1941) (per curiam)
(f = 2.31).
255. 34 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1941) (f = 2.55).
256. Id. at 839.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 340.
261. O’Hanlon v. Murray, 19 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941), rev’d, 34
N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1941).
262. 34 N.E.2d at 340.
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verdict.263 Finch and Desmond—who the model places at the
near right—voted to reverse and remand, arguing there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict on the theory of
the motorman’s negligence, but that there was an
actionable claim of negligence based on the failure of the
attendants to be more proactive.264
Looking more generally at the twelve high absolute f
personal injury cases with a written opinion, only one
resolves a legal issue of general importance and it is on a
fairly technical point.265 Curiously, during the 1938 to 1940
263. Id. (Rippey, J., concurring).
264. Id.
265. That case is Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 21 N.E.2d 507,
509 (N.Y. 1939) (f = -2.299), in which the court split 5-1 in a decision reversing a
verdict for the plaintiff and ordering a new trial on the ground a defendant is
entitled to a contributory negligence defense on a nuisance claim when nuisance
is pled alongside negligence so long as the defendant’s conduct is not an absolute
nuisance or a nuisance per se. Rippey dissented. Id. at 511. There are other
illustrative cases as well. See, e.g., O’Hanlon v. Murray, 34 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y.
1941); (see supra Part IV.F); Fontheim v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 24 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y.
1939) (see supra note 253); Volk v. City of New York, 30 N.E.2d 596, 597 (N.Y.
1940) (f = 2.73) (holding that a nurse was injured in the scope of employment
when a co-worker gave her an injection after the nurse became ill eating food);
Brown v. New York State Training Sch. for Girls, 32 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (N.Y.
1941) (f = -2.26) (holding that when a farmer injured on the job died as a result
of mistakenly taking a mercury tablet instead of a sedative the mistake, was a
superseding cause, making death benefits unavailable under workmen’s
compensation); Goldstein v. State, 24 N.E.2d 97, 101 (N.Y. 1939) (f = 2.228)
(holding member of state militia is not an employee for purposes of workmen’s
compensation and may bring negligence claim with Lehman dissenting on a
procedural point regarding the availability of appellate review); Daus v.
Gunderman & Sons, Inc., 28 N.E.2d 914, 917 (N.Y. 1940) (f = -2.21) (deciding
whether a decision of the State Industrial Board entered under an appellate
order is a final decision not open to review on factual questions); Keener v.
Tilton, 28 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1940) (f = 2.146) (finding in a 4-1 decision that a
street car company may be liable for injuries sustained by a passenger who
stepped into a foot-deep hole upon exiting the car on a dark street; Lehman was
the sole dissent); Mead v. Louer, 33 N.E.2d 534, 535 (N.Y. 1941) (f = -2.12)
(holding jury instruction that required motorman to anticipate victim’s
negligence erroneous because it eliminated contributory negligence as a
defense); Clarke v. Town of Russia, 28 N.E.2d 833, 834-35 (1940) (f = -2.077)
(deciding whether a member of the town board illegally employed to work on
highway was an employee of the town covered by workmen’s compensation so
that his widow and child could recover when he was killed on the job; Sears
writing an opinion for the majority holding no); Weinfeld v. Kaplan, 26 N.E.2d
287, 288 (N.Y. 1940) (f = -2.055) (holding neither landlord nor tenant were
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terms, in the handful of nonunanimous personal injury
cases that do resolve legal issues of more general
importance, voting is not along the dominant pattern. There
are unusual coalitions with judges on the right-wing
sometimes voting against the plaintiff and judges on the
left-wing voting with the plaintiff.266 We hesitate to draw
any conclusions from this because of the difficulty of
assessing the perceived significance of a case at the time
and the small number of cases that appear significant to us.
In one libel case self-described as presenting a significant
issue, the Rippey wing shows itself willing to liberalize the
law to redress careless conduct.267

liable to workman injured on premises as a result of an independent contractor
creating dangerous condition); Renzo v. Reid Ice Cream Corp., 17 N.E.2d 778,
778-79 (N.Y. 1938) (f = 2.039) (deciding whether a widow whose remarriage was
void was entitled to reinstatement of workmen’s compensation benefits during
the period between the purported remarriage and the determination that it was
void).
266. Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (N.Y. 1939) (f = .741), is the most
well-known personal injury decision from the period. It is a 5-2 decision that
creates a significant exception to a rule that violation by a plaintiff of a safety
statute is negligence per se. Lehman wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 992.
O’Brien and Finch dissent. Id. In De Salvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Corp., 23
N.E.2d 457, 458 (N.Y. 1939) (f = -1.097), the court held 4-2 that a theatre owner
was not negligent as a matter of law when two patrons were knocked over a low
balcony and hit someone sitting below because the owner had a right to rely on
the design by a reputable architect in accordance with building regulations.
Loughran joins Rippey in dissent. Id. at 459. In Hennessy v. Walker, 17 N.E.2d
782, 785 (N.Y. 1938) (f = .953), the court divides 5-2 in narrowly construing a
statute that made an owner of a “motor vehicle” liable for the negligence of
someone operating the vehicle with the owner’s consent not to cover negligence
in the use of an attached trailer. Rippey wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 787.
Crane and Loughran dissented. Id; see also Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19
N.E.2d 981, 985 (N.Y. 1939) (f = 1.703); supra dissussion Part IV.F.
267. Rose v. Daily Mirror, 31 N.E.2d 182, 182-83 (N.Y. 1940) (f = -2.78). The
Daily Mirror mistakenly reported in an obituary of the plaintiffs’ husband and
father that he was a notorious criminal. Id. The majority held this was not
actionable libel, stating:
[I]t has long been accepted law that a libel or slander upon the memory
of a deceased person which makes no direct reflection upon his relatives
gives them no cause of action for defamation. . . . [T]he complaint of
these plaintiffs can be sustained only if we are prepared to construct a
far-reaching extension of the law of libel as it has been generally
understood in this State for many years. Id.
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We are not sure what to make of the fact that the
conservative wing of the court on regulatory and labor
issues consistently sides with the plaintiff in personal injury
cases that split the court. In a number of personal injury
cases that turn on technical legal issues, one gets the sense
that judges on the right-wing are influenced by sympathy
for plaintiffs, particularly widows and children. In other
cases that turn on factual issues, the voting patterns may
be explained by giving greater deference to the jury.
Whatever the explanations, this pattern is opposite of what
we expect you would find in state supreme courts at least
from the 1970s on. One conclusion we draw is that as late as
1940, judges on the New York Court of Appeals thought of
personal injury law in less ideological and instrumental
terms that became commonplace later in the century.
CONCLUSION
This Article is an initial attempt to see what can be
learned about a state’s highest court by using methods traditionally applied to the United States Supreme Court. Rather than focusing on a limited number of high profile cases
and/or judges, we examine the decisions of all judges on all
nonunanimous cases that came before the New York Court
of Appeals from 1900 to 1941. We find that voting on the
New York Court of Appeals was patterned for much of the
period and highly patterned for parts. Patterned voting
raises the possibility that disagreements are a product of
deep and broad underlying differences in views and value.
Our hypothesis was that examining cases in which voting is
most patterned might illuminate whether there are such
underlying differences and what they might be. We believe
our findings support the hypothesis. Structured voting in
the New York Court of Appeals during the period we study
does seem to be the product of recurring disagreements on
such fundamental matters as the degree to which liability
for accidental harm should be fault-based; the relative value
of formality and flexibility in law; a backward-looking versus a forward-looking perspective; and deference due to othFinch’s dissent, in which Rippey and Conway joined, objects strenuously to the
unfairness of not compensating the plaintiffs, who awoke the morning after
their loved one’s death “to find blazoned forth in a morning newspaper that
decedent was a notorious criminal [when] . . . [t]he slightest effort at verification
would have shown the falsity of the story.” Id. at 183 (Finch, J., dissenting).
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er institutional actors, such as the legislature, the executive, and juries. The underlying points of disagreement that
drive patterned voting seem to change over time. But while
there are significant changes—particularly during the Cardozo era—we also find some interesting consistencies. Perhaps the most striking of these is the fact that at both the
beginning and end of the forty-year period we study, it is
judges on the court’s right-wing who consistently vote with
plaintiffs in tort cases that divide the court. This is unlike
the period around 1920 where it has been suggested a new
paradigm of liability without direct fault replaced the old
paradigm.
APPENDIX ONE: EXCLUDING THE INDEPENDENT VOTING
HYPOTHESIS

Conceptually, we can test the likelihood that the
observed patterns of voting are produced by independent
voting in the following way. First we use the observed vote
data from a particular term to compute a test statistic tobs.
Possible choices for this test statistic are discussed below.
Then we can generate new vote data under the null
hypothesis that the independence model is correct. This can
be accomplished by independently permuting the votes
(coded dissent/no dissent) of each judge. After a particular
permutation dataset is generated, say permutation dataset
i, the test statistic of interest can be calculated using the
permutation dataset. Call this ti. Repeat this procedure,
creating M permutation datasets along with M associated
values of the test statistic of interest. If tobs is unusual
relative to the collection {t1,…,tM} then we have reason to
believe that the observed data were not generated in a way
consistent with the independence model.
The test statistics that we consider all make use of the
collection of term-specific, pairwise agreement scores
between judges in nonunanimous cases.268 The agreement
score between judge j and j’ is simply the fraction of cases in
which j and j’ voted the same way out of the total number of
268. Agreement scores have long been used to summarize judicial behavior.
See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890, 893-94 (1941). For a
discussion of agreement scores within the context of ideal point models, see
KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING 19-26 (2005).
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cases that j and j’ sat together on. The collection of
agreement scores thus provides a concise summary of the
voting behavior of the judges and the resulting voting
coalitions.
Since each term of the court produces numerous
pairwise agreement scores—a term in which only seven
judges sit produces twenty-one agreement scores—we need
to find some way to collapse the collection of agreement
scores down to a scalar test statistic so that we can more
easily compare the observed agreement scores to the
permutation agreement scores.269 We chose to do this in two
ways. In the first, we subtract the smallest agreement score
in a term from the largest agreement score giving us the
range of the agreement scores in that term. In the second,
we subtract the 25th percentile of the agreement scores
from the 75th percentile resulting in the interquartile range
of the agreement scores.
Having chosen these test statistics we can now test the
independence model by comparing the observed statistics to
their permutation distribution. More specifically, we
generate 1001 permutation datasets and associated test
statistics and then calculate the fraction of these
permutation test statistics that are greater than or equal to
the observed test statistic. This produces a permutation pvalue. Given our choice of test statistic, an observed test
statistic that is either much greater or much less than the
permutation test statistics is evidence against the
independence model. Thus, a p-value that is either close to 0
or close to 1 is evidence against the independence model.
Figure A1 presents these term-specific p-values
graphically. Here we see that the p-values for the
agreement score range are nearly all less than 0.05. This
means that the observed agreement score range was
typically greater than that expected under the
independence model. Looking at the p-values for the
interquartile range of the agreement scores we again see pvalues that are generally close to 0. The p-values from the
269. The permutation data were generated by permuting the full term-specific
vote data. Unanimous cases were included in these datasets. In order to make
the tests of the independence model comparable to other tests discussed later,
the agreement scores for both the observed and permutation data were
calculated only using the nonunanimous cases.
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1930s data are somewhat higher. However, taken as a
whole, these results strongly suggest that the data from
most terms are not consistent with the independence
model—there appear to be meaningful associations among
the judges’ decisions in most terms.
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Figure A1. p-values from Term-by-Term Tests of a Null Hypothesis of
Independent Judicial Voting with Varying Propensities of Dissent. Solid
points denote p-values that are either above 0.95 or below 0.05.

APPENDIX TWO: A POSTERIOR CHECK OF THE DESCRIPTIVE
ADEQUACY OF THE MODEL

We use the IRT model to describe patterns in voting. A
possible concern is that our model-based summaries are
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missing important aspects of the data. While all models, by
their very nature, are simplifications of reality (and thus
omit some aspects of the observed data) we would hope that
our fitted model could reproduce voting data that look like
the observed data in many meaningful respects. If data
generated from our fitted model does not look like the
observed data, we would be concerned that the descriptive
inferences in the body of this paper are heavily dependent
on our choice of assumptions.
To allay this concern we employed posterior predictive
checks.270 The basic idea here is to compare the observed
data set to synthetic datasets that were generated from the
posterior predictive distribution. More specifically, we
compare the observed range and interquartile range of the
agreement scores in each term to the range and
interquartile range of agreement scores calculated from
datasets synthetically generated from the posterior
predictive distribution. A posterior predictive p-value can be
constructed by calculating the fraction of synthetic test
statistics that are greater than or equal to the observed test
statistic. Figure A2 presents these posterior predictive pvalues graphically. The vast majority of the p-values fall in
the range between 0.05 and 0.95, thus providing no strong
evidence against the descriptive adequacy of the IRT
model—at least for the chosen test statistics.

270. See Andrew Gelman, Exploratory Data Analysis for Complex Models, 13
J. OF COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STAT. 755, 758-59 (2004); Andrew Gelman et
al., Posterior Predictive Assessment of Model Fitness via Realized Discrepancies,
6 STATISTICA SINICA 733, 736-37 (1996); Herbert Hoijtink & Ivo W. Molenaar, A
Multidimensional Item Response Model: Constrained Latent Class Analysis
Using the Gibbs Sampler and Posterior Predictive Checks, 62 PSYCHOMETRIKA
171, 179 (1997); Xiao-Li Meng, Posterior Predictive p-Values, 22 ANNALS OF
STAT. 1142, 1142-44 (1994).
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Figure A2. Posterior Predictive p-values Based on Term-Specific Unidimensional Ideal Point Models. Solid points denote p-values that are
either above 0.95 or below 0.05.

